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Abstract
The first chapter evaluates the zero-leverage effect on firms' financial constraints.
Moreover, using investment- and cash-to-cash-flow sensitivities as financial constraint
indicators, the results suggest that unleveraged firms are expected to face lower constraints
relative to leveraged firms. Lastly, the results indicate that the zero-leverage effect on firms’
financial constraints is more likely stronger for smaller firms, zero-dividend firms, firms with
lower proportions of tangible assets, and growth firms. The second chapter develops a new
quantitative measure that reflects the extent to which a firm complies to Shariah relative to
the other firms located in a certain region at a certain time. This measure can be customized
to be consistent with each investor’s objectives, constraints, and beliefs. We argue that the
use of this measure is preferable to the existing use of ratio thresholds for the following two
reasons. First, it is more Shariah-appropriate because it provides the Shariah-compliant
investor with a clear understanding of the relative compliance status of each firm he wishes
to invest in. Second, it can be incorporated into any portfolio optimization model to create a
balance between improving Shariah compliance and not compromising investment returns.

JEL Classification: G31, G32, G33.
Keywords: leverage, financial constraints, zero leverage, equity screens, compliance.
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CHAPTER 1
The Zero Leverage Effect on Firms’ Financial Constraints
1. Introduction:
Agency problems and capital market imperfections (i.e., information asymmetries,
transaction costs, taxes, etc.) make the costs of external capital greater than the
opportunity cost of internal finances. As a result, firms will start financing their
current and future investments using their internally generated funds. When
internal finances are exhausted, the potential returns of the remaining investment
opportunities are compared to the costs of external capital. If the potential returns
are lower than the costs of external funds, firms will forgo some of their profitable
investments. The above discussion explains why firms can be financially constrained
and why firms’ investments may be sensitive to the extent of internal finances.
Empirical studies show that certain firm characteristics could potentially mitigate
the severity of a firm’s financial constraints. Examples of such characteristics include
firms with concentrated ownership, firms with management ownership, firms with
high credit rating, large mature firms, multidivisional firms, and bank-connected
firms. Obviously, financial constraints of firms lacking the above characteristics are
more likely to be higher. Connecting between the theoretical explanations and the
empirical findings, it seems clear that the above-mentioned firm characteristics do
mitigate financial constraints by loosening the effects of agency problems and/or
capital market imperfections. For example, Brennan and Hughes (1991) imply that
larger corporations have fewer information asymmetries than smaller companies,
making them more financially flexible and reducing their external financing costs.
Consistent with this view, Fazzari et al. (1988) hypothesize that investment-to-cashflow sensitivity increases as market financial frictions increase.
To our knowledge, the previous literature did not explicitly examine the level of
financial constraints in zero-leverage (hereafter, ZL) firms. This study contributes to
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the corporate finance literature by evaluating firms’ financial constraint status across
different sorts of zero- and low-leveraged firms. Over the previous few decades,
researchers have proposed many financial constraint indicators. One commonly used
constraint indicator is a firm’s leverage ratio. Due to bankruptcy costs, companies
with higher leverage outstanding are likely to have limited access to external capital
and thus greater levels of financial constraints. However, several researchers
document that leverage's endogeneity feature can lead to a complex non-monotonic
relationship between financial constraints and leverage (e.g., Hennessy and Whited,
2007; Acharya et al., 2007). So, we argue that to understand how firms’ financial
constraints are associated with leverage, one needs to investigate the level of
constraints across different sorts of unlevered firms using several dimensions
pertaining to research methodology.
We argue that the ZL effect on firms’ financial constraints is expected to vary
depending on the firm lifecycle stage. For example, the ZL effect is expected to
decrease as firms move towards their mature lifecycle stage. Firms in their startup
or early growth stages are expected to have financial constraint levels that are
extremely susceptible to leverage levels. As firms become more mature, their
financial constraint levels become less affected by leverage levels. Since gauging
financial constraints is crucial in this paper, we use multiple approaches for gauging
financial constraints. First, we measure the ZL effect on investment- and cash-tocash-flow sensitivities. Next, using a three-way interacted multivariate regression
model, we test whether the ZL effect on investment- and cash-to-cash-flow
sensitivities is different for smaller firms, zero-dividend firms, firms with lower
proportions of tangible assets, and growth firms compared to larger firms, dividendpaying firms, firms with higher proportions of tangible assets, and value firms,
respectively.
This paper is motivated by Strebulaev and Yang (2013), who suggest that familycompanies and companies with higher management ownership likely to have lower
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levels of leverage. Managers with substantial ownership are expected to be underdiversified, making their personal distress costs relatively-higher. Similarly, family
members focus on maintaining the family legacy and hence try to avoid leverage due
to their desire for long-term survival. Strebulaev and Yang argue that firms’
governance characteristics and ownership structure are important determinants of
the ZL phenomena. But there are also other possible determinants. Investigating the
level of constraints within different groups of unlevered firms may contribute to
understanding the motives of following conservative debt policies.
This paper hypothesizes that, on average, unlevered firms are expected to face
lower financial constraints relative to leveraged firms. Moreover, the ZL effect on
firms’ financial constraints is more likely to be weaker for smaller firms, zerodividend firms, firms with lower proportions of tangible assets, and growth firms.
Using two alternative financial constraint measures, the results indicate that
unleveraged firms have lower levels of financial constraints relative to leveraged
firms. Furthermore, the negative ZL effect on firms’ financial constraints is weaker
for larger firms, dividend-paying firms, firms with higher proportions of tangible
assets, and value firms. The results are consistent with the debt overhang theory that
explains how the existence of leverage can reduce firms’ value by weakening their
incentive for undertaking profitable future investments (Myers, 1977). Moreover, the
results suggest that firms in their early lifecycles should avoid increasing their
leverage levels. This will allow them to overcome the effects of financial constraints
and to utilize their valuable future investment opportunities. Finally, the results
have vital implications. For example, several studies hypothesize that firms’ financial
constraints can have considerable effects on firms’ investments, capital structure, and
stock returns (e.g., Lamont et al., 2001; Hennessy and Whited, 2007).
The paper is organized as follows. Section two highlights some of the capital
market imperfection theories and discusses some of the empirical studies that relate
to financial constraints. Section three develops our research hypothesis. Section four
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presents the data sources and methodology. Section five analyzes and reports the
results. Section six concludes.
2. Theoretical Aspects and Literature Overview:

2.1. The theoretical explanation:
Modigliani and Miller (1958) traditional neoclassical investment theory implies
that, in a perfect capital market, companies undertake any profitable project and the
choice of financing mix is irrelevant. According to this theory, internal funds’
availability does not affect investment decisions. Managers perceive the opportunity
cost of internally generated funds to be the market interest rate, and they can lend
and borrow at this rate. With capital market imperfections, however, prices and
interest rates do not fully adjust to allow firms to undertake all desired investments.
Under these circumstances, firms' investment and financing decisions are
interdependent. If firm insiders have better information about the firm’s risk and
return than do potential investors, then external financing costs will increase relative
to internal financing.
The primary insight on the effects of asymmetric information comes from Akerlof's
(1970) analysis of the "lemons" problem, in which the vendors of a product have more
information about its quality than do purchasers. Since outsiders cannot differentiate
between good and bad investment projects, they will require higher returns from good
projects to cover the losses incurred from inadvertently purchasing bad ones. Hence,
insufficient internally generated funds may constrain future corporate investments.
A firm is deemed as financially constrained when negative shocks decrease its
investment spending. This is either because the firm cannot continue drawing from
its relatively-inexpensive internal finances, or because lower collateral increases
external financing costs (Fazzari et al., 1988).
Aside from information asymmetry, other frictions (e.g., tax advantages,
transaction costs, agency problems, and financial distress costs) could also contribute
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to explaining why external capital costs more than internally generated funds. The
design of the corporate tax systems has historically brought a cost advantage to
internal finances over external finances. Moreover, new share issues of seasoned
equity are associated with a variety of transaction costs, including underwriting
discounts, registration fees, and administrative expenses. Costs associated with
monitoring and controlling the agency problems also contribute to increasing the total
costs of raising external capital. The agency costs of equity arise from conflicts
between shareholders who are focused on wealth maximization and managers who
are focused on maximizing their personal control and power. Similarly, the agency
cost of debt arises from the debt contracts’ limited liability feature that incentivizes
firm managers to make decisions that contradicts the lenders’ interests. Finally,
bankruptcy and financial distress costs, which arises when a firm has difficulties
meeting its payment obligations, also contribute to increasing external financing
costs.

1.2. An empirical overview:
This section will briefly highlight some of the empirical studies that examine
firms’ financial constraint status under different circumstances. The empirical
findings suggest that certain firm-specific characteristics could potentially mitigate
the severity of financial constraints by loosening the effects of agency problems and/or
capital market imperfections. Examples of such characteristics include firms with
concentrated institutional ownership, firms with management ownership, firms with
high credit rating, dividend-paying firms, large mature firms, multidivisional firms,
and bank-connected firms.
1.2.1. Ownership structure:
Jensen and Meckling (1976) focus on the conflict of interest that may occur
between managers and shareholders. Managers have incentives to exploit firm assets
for empire building or as perquisites. But managerial ownership may actually help
align the interests of shareholders and managers, lowering agency and external
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financing costs (Morck et al., 1988). However, as managerial ownership increases,
monitoring managers becomes difficult because managers will have greater control
over the company (McConnell and Servaes, 1990). Hence, at lower percentages of
managerial ownership, the incentive alignment effect is expected to mitigate firms’
financial constraints. But, after a certain percentage of managerial ownership, the
entrenchment effect is expected to impair firms’ ability to raise external finances
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991).
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) imply that large stockholders with concentrated
ownership have greater incentive to monitor the behavior of managers than minority
stockholders. Hence, agency cost models predict that a more concentrated ownership
structure decreases in the severity of financial constraints. Large stockholders,
however, enjoy private control benefits that minority stockholders lack (Shleifer and
Vishny, 1997). Consequently, large stockholders might have motives to hold more
cash to consume their private control benefits (Faccio et al., 2001). Ozkan and Ozkan
(2004) test which of the two ownership concentration effects (i.e., the monitoring
effect or the private benefits effect) dominates the other. Their results suggest that
concentrated ownership in itself insignificantly impacts firms’ cash holdings.
However, their results indicate that controlling owners’ type impacts cash holdings.
They find that controlling family firms are likely to hold more cash than controlling
institutional firms. Furthermore, Faccio and Lang (2002) claim that controlling
institutional owners are likely to provide more effective monitoring of the
management than those of controlling family owners. The above studies suggest that,
because they are better monitors, controlling institutional shareholders improve
firms’ abilities to raise external finances. Controlling family owners, on the other
hand, avoid high external financing costs by holding more cash. They may, in some
cases, impair firms’ access to external capital due to the private benefit incentives
certain family owners are subject to.
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1.2.2. Dividend-paying firms:
Noting that constrained companies are not in a condition to distribute
considerable amounts of dividends, Fazzari et al. (1988) categorized companies based
on their payout behavior and find that cash flow sensitivity of investment is higher
for companies that retain almost-all their income. Hennessy and Whited (2007)
divided their sample according to firm size and dividends payouts, then evaluate
external financing costs across different types of firms. They find that both large firms
and high-dividend paying firms are expected to bear lower external financing costs.
Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) indicate that companies with high dividends payout ratios
have greater financial flexibility since they can internally raise the needed capital by
cutting dividends. But dividends tend to be sticky, meaning that most companies are
unwilling to cut specified dividends (Brav et al., 2005). This makes it hard for
companies to rely on dividends cuts as a form of internal financing. Constraintinducing economic shocks, however, may force firms to cut dividends if the costs
associated with dividends cuts are lower than external financing costs. The above
studies suggest that high dividend-paying firms may indeed be less financially
constrained, but there are costs associated with dividends cuts that restrain the
reliance of such cuts.
2.2.3. Large and mature firms and firms with high credit rating:
Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) find that cash flow sensitivity of investment is
greater in small firms and firms with neither commercial paper ratings nor bond
ratings, while they do not find significant sensitivities for large firms and firms with
credit ratings. Other studies grouping firms by size, age, and bond rating, also
support the view that small, immature firms and firms with low credit ratings face
limited access to external capital (e.g., Devereux and Schiantarelli, 1990; Schaller,
1993; Chirinko and Schaller, 1995). Consistent with these studies, Vasan and Srini
(1987) find that internal finances are more volatile over the business cycle in smaller
firms. They show that because smaller companies have limited access to external
finances during downturns than larger companies, business recessions are likely to
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have a higher impact on their growth rates and investment behavior. Finally,
Brennan and Hughes (1991) imply that large companies have fewer information
asymmetries than small companies, suggesting that small companies may face
additional external financing costs (Whited, 1992; Kim et al., 1998).
2.2.4. Multidivisional firms:
Unlike specialized firms, diversified firms are expected to have non-core segment
assets that can be sold, making them less susceptible to financial distress. Specialized
firms, on the contrary, are often liquidated during financial distress (Titman and
Wessels, 1988). Moreover, since divisions of diversified companies have imperfectly
correlated cash flows, low growth divisions’ cash flows can be used to subsidize high
growth low cash flow divisions (Subramaniam et al., 2011). The above arguments
suggest that diversification has the effect of reducing the severity of firms’ financial
constraints. Supporting this view, Tong (2011) documents that cash’s value is
considerably lower in diversified companies than in specialized companies. In a more
recent study, Erel et al. (2015) test the claim that acquisitions mitigate firms’
financial constraints in target firms. They find that target firms’ cash holdings, cash
flow sensitivity of cash, and cash flow sensitivity of investment all decline, whereas
investments increase following an acquisition. Likewise, Matvos et al. (2017) imply
that diversified corporations increase their scope during times of rising external
financial frictions. Their evidence supports the view that firms diversify in response
to constraint-inducing capital markets.
2.2.5. Bank-connected firms:
Berlin and Loeys (1988) claim that bank lending can reduce agency problem and
information asymmetry costs. This is primarily because banks have a comparative
advantage in monitoring managers’ actions and in analyzing information. Supporting
this view, Fama (1985) suggests that banks can access private information and collect
information at lower costs. Furthermore, James (1987) imply that bank credit
agreement announcements convey positive signals regarding the credit-worthiness of
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the borrowing firms. These studies imply that firms with greater bank debt are likely
to be less financially constrained.

2.3. Cash holdings and financial constraints:
Capital market imperfections explain why some companies hold sizeable amounts
of cash despite the opportunity costs associated with such holdings. In addition to the
opportunity cash-holding costs, Jensen (1986) suggests that entrenched managers
may waste firms’ free cash flows by investing in nonprofitable projects. In view of
this, Opler et al. (1999) suggest that management should set cash holdings at a level
where the holdings marginal benefit equals the holdings marginal cost. The two
major benefits of holding cash are emphasized by Keynes (1936), which are the costs
and precautionary motives. The costs motive points out the capacity of a firm facing
internal resource shortages to avoid additional costs associated with selling assets or
raising external finances. The precautionary motive focuses on the costs resulting
from unanticipated contingencies and foregone investments. More recently,
Faulkender and Wang (2006) report that cash holdings marginal benefit is higher for
firms with greater external financing costs than those with lower costs.1
Fama and French (2001) claim that dividend payouts are negatively related to
market to book ratio. In this view, Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) propose high growth
firms are likely to hold more cash to minimize foregone investment costs. Similarly,
Faulkender and Wang (2006) suggest that the cash’s value is higher for companies
with good investment opportunities. These studies imply that firms with greater
external financing costs and firms with good investment opportunities should hold
more cash.2

1
2

See also Pinkowitz and Williamson (2006).
See Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Denis and Sibilkov (2010), and Almeida et al. (2011).
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2.4. Leverage and financial constraints:
One commonly used proxy for financial constraints is a firm’s leverage ratio. Due
to bankruptcy costs, highly leveraged firms are likely to have greater external
financing costs. Many financial constraints indexes (e.g., the Kaplan and Zingales
(1997) index, the Cleary (1999) index, and the Whited and Wu (2005) index) use low
leverage as an indicator for firms being less constrained. However, as suggested by
Hennessy and Whited (2007), the use of leverage, in this case, is misleading because
if bankruptcy costs increase, firms will optimally substitute equity for debt making
them falsely appear less constrained. Moreover, several studies cast doubts about the
use of leverage as an indicator of firms’ financial constraints. Hadlock and Pierce
(2010) document that leverage's endogeneity feature can lead to a complex nonmonotonic relationship between financial constraints and leverage.
In the same spirit, Almeida et al. (2011) point out that firms can be financially
constrained during normal times even if they have low leverage ratios. Consider the
case of a small firm in an emerging economy that have very limited access to external
finances and hence chooses to have low levels of leverage. Large highly-leveraged US
firm, on the other hand, may easily raise external capital to fund any profitable
investment opportunity. Finally, some companies may deviate from their ideal capital
structure and choose not to lever up for governance considerations (Strebulaev and
Yang, 2013). After investigating the economic factors that motivate companies to
become zero leveraged, Strebulaev and Yang indicate that family companies and
companies with higher management ownership are expected to have lower levels of
leverage.
In an attempt to further examine the relation between leverage and financial
constraints, several studies imply that leverage imposes constraints only for
companies with weak growth opportunities (e.g., Lang et al., 1996; Aivazian et al.,
2005). For diversified companies, Lang et al. (1996) document that leverage does not
reduce growth for segments with strong growth opportunities but is negatively related
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to growth for segments with weak growth prospects. This is because strong growth
opportunities are expected to generate higher cash flows, allowing companies to
easily refinance and recapitalize in the capital market. Weak growth opportunities,
in the contrary, may not be sufficient to overcome the debt overhang problem or may
not be recognized by external capital markets. Aivazian et al. (2005) document
similar evidence using information on Canadian publicly traded companies. In
contrast to these studies, McConnell and Servaes (1995) claim that leverage prompts
underinvestment by showing that leverage is negatively related to corporate value
for companies with strong growth prospects. McConnell and Servaes also imply that
leverage mitigates overinvestment by reporting that leverage is positively related to
corporate value for companies with weak growth prospects. Consistent with the
underinvestment hypothesis, Acharya et al. (2007) suggest that constrained firms
that anticipate strong growth prospects direct most of their excess cash flows towards
reducing leverage.
3. Research Hypotheses:
Myers (1977) demonstrates that leverage increases the probability of financial
distress and debt overhang, creating a tendency for firms to make decisions that are
undesirable to debtholders. Moreover, Altman (1984) suggest that leverage can also
result in direct and indirect bankruptcy costs, impairing access to external finances3.
Hence, due to bankruptcy and financial distress costs, firms with high leverage
outstanding are generally expected to have lower debt capacity and greater external
financing costs. Based on these observations, we suggest the following hypothesis:

H1: On average, unlevered firms are expected to face lower financial constraints
relative to levered firms, all things being equal.

As documented by Altman (1984), indirect bankruptcy costs can include profits that a firm is expected
to earn if there was no bankruptcy potential. The direct bankruptcy costs consist of accounting, legal,
and other managerial costs.
3

11

Brennan and Hughes (1991) suggest that as companies grow in size, their
information asymmetries tend to decrease. This implies that small firms may face
greater costs of debt financing because lenders cannot distinguish between good and
bad investments (Whited, 1992; Kim et al., 1998). Moreover, Vasan and Srini (1987)
find that smaller firms’ internal cash-flows are more volatile over the business cycle
than in larger firms. Hence, smaller firms will have very limited access to credit
during economic downturns because their likelihood of bankruptcy is higher. This
suggests that small firms are expected to have financial constraint levels that are
extremely vulnerable to their leverage levels4. Additionally, Titman and Wessels
(1988) imply that large diversified firms have greater financial flexibility than small
specialized firms, making them less likely to experience bankruptcy or financial
distress5. This is because, if need be, large diversified firms are capable of (1) selling
off some of their non-core segments or (2) subsidizing low-cash-generating-segments
using funds from high-cash-generating-segments. This implies that large diversified
firms' financial constraint levels are less prone to their leverage levels. Based on these
observations, we suggest that:

H2: All things being equal, the ZL effect on firms’ financial constraints is more likely
to be weaker for larger firms relative to smaller firms.
Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) suggest that firms that pay dividends are less financially
constrained since they have the capacity for cutting back their dividends to fund
profitable investments opportunities. Furthermore, Hennessy and Whited (2007)
document that dividend-paying firms face lower costs of external capital relative to
zero-dividend firms. Moreover, Fazzari et al. (1988) imply that dividend-paying firms’
cash flow sensitivity of investment is lower compared to zero-dividend firms. Lastly,

Schaller (1993), Devereux and Schiantarelli (1990), Chirinko and Schaller (1995), and Hadlock and
Pierce (2010) also document evidence suggesting that smaller firms have lower capital access relative
to larger firms.
5 Erel, Jang, and Weisbach (2015) and Matvos et al. (2017) also document evidence suggesting that
diversified corporations are less financially constrained relative stand-alone companies.
4
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noting that they enjoy greater flexibility in dealing with financial contingencies, the
bankruptcy likelihoods of firms that pay dividends are expected to be lower relative
to zero-dividend firms. This indicates that dividend-paying firms' financial constraint
levels are less susceptible to their leverage levels. Based on these observations, we
hypothesize that:

H3: All things being equal, the ZL effect on firms’ financial constraints is more likely
to be weaker for dividend-paying firms compared to zero-dividend firms.
Harris and Raviv (1991) claim that there is a consensus that leverage tends to
increase with fixed tangible assets. This is because tangible assets are in effect better
collateral. Moreover, firms with valuable tangible assets enjoy greater financial
flexibility because they can sell off some of their less-efficient assets to meet debt
obligations or to finance good investment opportunities (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992).
Hence, tangible assets decrease firms’ bankruptcy likelihoods. This suggests that
firms with high tangibility have financial constraints that are less sensitive to their
leverage levels. Based on these observations, we hypothesize that:

H4: All things being equal, the ZL effect on firms’ financial constraints is more likely
to be weaker for firms with high tangibility compared to firms with low tangibility.
Myers’ (1977) debt overhang theory explains how corporate leverage can reduce
firms’ value by weakening their incentive to undertake good future investments. This
happens because part of the investments’ profits must first be collected by debtholders, leaving equity-holders with lower profits6. Myers also explains why
managers often set firms’ target leverage ratios relative to book as opposed to market
values. This is because the amount of corporate leverage collateralized by existing
assets will be more than is collateralized by future growth. Consistent with the debt

6

or no profits in cases when the debt overhang is significant and/or when profits are low.
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overhang theory, Lang et al. (1995) document a negative relation between future
growth and leverage that holds regardless of which proxies used to estimate growth7.
Hence, based on the view that growth opportunities may not be regarded as adequate
collateral, may not be sufficient to overcome the debt overhang problem, or may not
be recognized by external capital markets, we suggest the following hypothesis:

H5: All things being equal, the ZL effect on firms’ financial constraints is more likely
to be weaker for value firms compared to growth firms.
4. Data and Methodology
We use merged annual Compustat and CRSP for our accounting and financial
dataset over the period 1965–2017. We exclude financial, utility, non-US, and nonpublicly traded firms8. Following most recent capital structure papers9, the book
leverage ratio in year t of firm i is defined as follows:

𝐵𝐿𝑖𝑡 =

𝐷𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝐷𝐿𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡

(1)

Where AT refers to total assets. DLTT refers to long-term debt and DLC refers to
short-term debt. The market leverage ratio in year t of firm i is defined as follows:

𝑀𝐿𝑖𝑡 =

𝐷𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝐷𝐿𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝐷𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝐷𝐿𝐶𝑖𝑡 + (𝐶𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑖𝑡 × 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝐶_𝐹𝑖𝑡 )

(2)

Aivazian and Qiu (2005) and Ahn, Denis, and Denis (2006) also suggest that leverage is negatively
associated with firms' future investments and growth.
8 We exclude SIC codes from 6000 to 6999 for financial firms and codes from 4900 to 4999 for utility
firms. Firms with FIC not equal to “USA” are also excluded. Finally, non-publicly traded firms with
STKO equal to one and two are excluded as well.
9 See Lemmon et al. (2008); Lemmon and Zender (2010); Leary and Roberts (2010); Graham and Leary
(2010); and Strebulaev and Yang (2013).
7
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Where CSHO refers to year-end share price and PRCC_F refers to year-end shares
outstanding. Following, we present the two approaches used for assessing the level
of financial constraints in ZL and AZL firms.

4.1. Cash flow sensitivity of cash:
Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) posit a model in which cash-to-cash-flow
sensitivity can be used to measure a firm’s financial constraint status. They imply
that constrained firms’ cash savings should increase when cash flows are greater,
while unconstrained firms’ cash holdings are unassociated to changes in cash flows.
Almeida et al. categorize firms according to constraint indicators using five
alternative methods: asset size, dividend payout ratios, commercial paper ratings,
bond ratings, and the KZ index. They find, for each of the first four methods, that
cash flow sensitivity of cash is almost-zero for unconstrained firms, but positive for
constrained firms Almeida.
Following Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) and Erel et al. (2015), the
dependent variable of our regression is the change in the cash-to-assets’ ratio. We use
the subsequent regression to assess the ZL effect on cash flow sensitivity of cash:

∆(

𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤
) = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1 𝑍𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 (
) + 𝛽3 (𝑍𝐿𝑖𝑡 )(
)𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑠 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠

(5)

𝑗=4

Where ZL is a binary variable that equals one if a firm-year observation is
unlevered and zero otherwise. 𝛿𝑠 are sector binary variables controlling for sector
fixed effects; 𝛿𝑡 are year binary variables controlling for year fixed effects. We include
various firm-specific variables to control for other variables affecting the change in
the cash-to-assets’ ratio. Namely, we include total assets, equity capitalization, age,
number of employees, sales growth, market-to-book ratio, sales-to-assets, dividendto-assets, dividend binary variable, cash-to-assets, investment-to-assets, asset saleto-assets, EBITDA-to-assets, share repurchases-to-assets, taxes paid-to-assets,
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tangibility, and R&D-to-sales. We expect the coefficient on the ZL binary variable
interacted with cash flow to be negative, indicating that unlevered firms are more
likely to have lower cash flow sensitivity of cash (i.e., lower financial constraints)
compared to leveraged firms.
Next, to test whether the ZL effect on cash flow sensitivity of cash is lower for
larger firms, dividend-paying firms, firms with high tangibility, and value firms, we
use the following three-way-interacted-multivariate regression:

∆(

𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤
) = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1 𝑍𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 (
) + 𝛽3 (𝑍𝐿𝑖𝑡 )(
)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 3𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 (3𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑖𝑡 )(
) + 𝛽6 (𝑍𝐿𝑖𝑡 )( 3𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑖𝑡 )
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤
+ 𝛽7 (𝑍𝐿𝑖𝑡 )( 3𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑖𝑡 )(
)𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑠 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
(6)
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝑗=8

Where 3rdI is the third interacted binary variable. Our tests require for the above
regression to have four separate formats. In the first format, we test whether the ZL
effect on cash flow sensitivity of cash is lower for larger firms relative to smaller firms.
Here, 3rdI equals one if a firm-year observation’s total assets value is above the mean
sample’s total assets and zero otherwise. In the second format, we test whether the
ZL effect on cash flow sensitivity of cash is lower for dividend-paying firms relative
to zero-dividend firms. Here, 3rdI equals one if a firm-year observation has positive
dividend and zero otherwise. In the third format, we test whether the ZL effect on
cash flow sensitivity of cash is lower for firms with high tangibility relative to firms
with low tangibility. Here, 3rdI equals one if a firm-year observation’s fixed-assetsto-assets ratio is above the mean sample’s ratio and zero otherwise. In the last format,
we test whether the ZL effect on cash flow sensitivity of cash is lower for value firms
relative to growth firms. Here, 3rdI equals one if a firm-year observation’s marketto-book ratio is below the mean sample’s ratio and zero otherwise
In all three formats, we expect the three-way-interacted-coefficient, 𝛽7 , to be
negative. This indicates that the ZL effect on firms’ cash flow sensitivity of cash is
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weaker for larger firms, dividend-paying firms, firms with high tangibility, and value
firms.

4.2. Cash flow sensitivity of investment:
Fazzari et al. (1988) develop a model in which financial constraints is measured
by firms’ investment-to-cash-flow sensitivity. The idea is that for a financially
constrained firm, cash flow growths will allow it to take on more investments.
Unconstrained firms’ investments, on the contrary, will not change with changes in
cash flows. Here, we use a similar model as for the cash-to-cash-flow sensitivity with
only one change. Namely, we use investment-to-assets ratio as the dependent
variable rather than the change in the ratio of cash-to-assets.

(

𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤
) = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1 𝑍𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 (
) + 𝛽3 (𝑍𝐿𝑖𝑡 )(
)𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑠 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝑖𝑡
𝑖𝑡

(7)

𝑗=2

Again, we expect the coefficient on ZL binary variable, 𝛽3 , interacted with cash
flow-to-assets to be negative, indicating that unleveraged firms have, on average,
lower investment-to-cash-flow sensitivity relative to leveraged firms. Additionally,
we run four formats of the three-way-interacted-multivariate regression to test
whether the ZL effect on investment-to-cash-flow sensitivity is lower for larger firms,
dividend-paying firms, firms with high tangibility, and value firms.

(

𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤
) = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1 𝑍𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 (
)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 (𝑍𝐿𝑖𝑡 )(
)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 3𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 (3𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑖𝑡 )(
)𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6 (𝑍𝐿𝑖𝑡 )( 3𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑖𝑡 ) + 𝛽7 (𝑍𝐿𝑖𝑡 )( 3𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑖𝑡 )(

𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤
)𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑠 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠

(8)

𝑗=8

We expect the three-way interacted coefficient, 𝛽7 , to be negative in all four
formats, indicating that the ZL effect on firms’ cash flow sensitivity of investment is
weaker for larger firms, dividend-paying firms, firms with higher proportions of
tangible assets, and value firms.
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TABLE 1.1: YEARLY FREQUENCIES OF ZL AND AZL FIRMS
This table displays the yearly frequencies of ZL and AZL firms from 1965 to 2017. ZL (zero leveraged) firms are
firms that have a yearly book leverage ratio of zero. AZL (almost-zero-leveraged) firms are firms that have a
yearly book leverage ratio below 5%. Column Obs. reports the number of firms in a given year in the sample.
Financial firms, utility firms, non-US firms, and non-publicly traded firms are excluded.
Year

ZL

AZL

Obs.

Year

ZL

AZL

Obs.

1965

0.1053

0.2040

1539

1992

0.0952

0.2253

4190

1966

0.0918

0.1669

1678

1993

0.1059

0.2439

4543

1967

0.0767

0.1467

1813

1994

0.1097

0.2437

4851

1968

0.0628

0.1381

2231

1995

0.1138

0.2527

5402

1969

0.0546

0.1165

2454

1996

0.1257

0.2799

5737

1970

0.0468

0.1016

2520

1997

0.1290

0.2885

5751

1971

0.0492

0.1132

2641

1998

0.1277

0.2700

5738

1972

0.0512

0.1217

2793

1999

0.1281

0.2858

5692

1973

0.0443

0.1027

2932

2000

0.1355

0.3028

5367

1974

0.0367

0.0902

3270

2001

0.1422

0.2998

4796

1975

0.0453

0.1175

3243

2002

0.1555

0.3052

4522

1976

0.0468

0.1212

3267

2003

0.1748

0.3220

4366

1977

0.0478

0.1231

3242

2004

0.1871

0.3419

4308

1978

0.0416

0.1110

3171

2005

0.1951

0.3520

4275

1979

0.0397

0.1048

3120

2006

0.1980

0.3457

4157

1980

0.0412

0.1110

3152

2007

0.1963

0.3516

4030

1981

0.0483

0.1260

3207

2008

0.1877

0.3204

3830

1982

0.0458

0.1327

3300

2009

0.1959

0.3428

3670

1983

0.0544

0.1720

3494

2010

0.2029

0.3640

3549

1984

0.0497

0.1502

3483

2011

0.2073

0.3464

3487

1985

0.0520

0.1477

3595

2012

0.2022

0.3283

3457

1986

0.0573

0.1531

3737

2013

0.2059

0.3221

3487

1987

0.0621

0.1566

3799

2014

0.2025

0.3096

3437

1988

0.0576

0.1478

3695

2015

0.1954

0.2967

3317

1989

0.0635

0.1553

3637

2016

0.1905

0.2888

3165

1990

0.0703

0.1730

3671

2017

0.1924

0.2860

2989

1991

0.0837

0.2007

3847

Average

0.1153

0.2318

-
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FIGURE 1.1: YEARLY FREQUENCIES OF ZL AND AZL FIRMS
This figure displays the fraction of ZL and AZL firms across the years from 1965 to 2017. ZL (zero leveraged)
firms are firms that have a yearly book leverage ratio of zero. AZL (almost-zero-leveraged) firms are firms that
have a yearly book leverage ratio below 5%. Financial firms, utility firms, non-US firms, and non-publicly traded
firms are excluded.
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5. Results:
This section highlights the sample descriptive statistics and reports the results of
the two models described in the previous section.
Table 1 and figure 1 report the yearly proportions of unlevered firms from 1965 to
2017. On average, 11.5% of our entire sample yearly firm observations are unlevered,
from a minimum of 3.7% in 1974 to a maximum of 20.7% in 2011. An upward trend
on the ZL behavior that lasted three decades (i.e., from 1980 to 2010) seems very
clear. Over the period from 2000 to 2017, the average unlevered yearly firm
observation is 18.7%, compared to only 4.8% from 1970 to 1987. This signifies how
substantial the change in US firms leverage behavior over the past four decades.
Following previous studies10, we also report the yearly fraction of firms that are
almost-zero-leveraged (hereafter, AZL). AZL firms are firms that have a book
leverage ratio of less than 5%. On average, 23.1% of our entire sample yearly firm
observations are AZL. About 33% can be categorized as AZL over the period from
2000 to 2017, compared to only 12.5% from 1970 to 1987. Similar to the ZL behavior,
there is an impressive rising AZL behavior trend over the past four decades, from a
minimum of 9% in 1974 to a maximum of 36.4% in 2010.
Table 2 reports several descriptive statistics for a sample of 194,644 yearly
observations from 1965 to 2017. For each variable, the mean, median, and standard
deviation values are reported. The last column reports the difference between the
mean value of unleveraged and leveraged firms. The numbers in parentheses are pvalues associated with the parametric two-sample t-test. Leveraged firms’ average
leverage ratio is 30%. Moreover, on average, unlevered firms have total assets of
about $316 million, whereas levered firms have total assets of about $1,719 million.
The difference in total assets between the mean value of unleveraged and leveraged
firms is $1,403 million and is statistically significant. Again, equity capitalization is
See Leland and Toft, 1996; Fischer et al., 1989; Goldstein et al., 2001; Ju et al., 2005; Strebulaev
and Yang, 2013.
10
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TABLE 1.2: ZL DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
This table reports several descriptive statistics for a sample of 197,388 yearly observations from 1965 to 2017. For
each variable, the observations’ number, mean, median, standard deviation are reported. Total assets and equity
capitalization are reported in million USD. Values for the number of employees are reported in million units. The
last column reports the difference between the mean value of unleveraged and leveraged firms. The numbers in
parentheses are p-values associated with the parametric two-sample t-test.
Zero Leverage Firms

Leveraged Firms

Significance tests

Obs.

Mean

SD

Median

Obs.

Mean

SD

Median

Difference in
means

Leverage Ratio

22808

0.000

0.000

0.000

174580

0.302

0.294

0.258

.302
(0.0000)

Total Assets

22808

315.896

2270

66.849

174580

1718.7

12303

116.718

1402.818
(0.0000)

Equity Capitalization

20908

987.594

10465

129.322

155729

1895.2

12864

93.307

907.652
(0.0000)

Age

22808

17.989

12.494

16.000

174580

22.421

15.103

19.000

4.432
(0.0000)

Number of Employees

22585

2.545

17.525

0.350

172982

8.793

37.751

1.401

6.248
(0.0000)

Market-to-Book Ratio

20871

2.821

3.466

1.988

155402

1.778

4.118

1.395

-1.043
(0.0000)

Sales Growth

19333

0.099

0.599

0.094

158744

0.115

0.422

0.090

.016
(0.0000)

Sales-to-Assets

22798

1.114

1.596

0.894

174538

1.327

1.064

1.169

.213
(0.0000)

Dividend Binary Variable

22808

0.291

0.454

0.000

174580

0.415

0.493

0.000

.124
(0.0000)

Dividend-to-Assets

22801

0.022

0.098

0.000

174551

0.011

0.043

0.000

-.010
(0.0000)

Cash Flow-to-Assets

21244

0.016

0.278

0.077

158687

0.049

0.178

0.078

.033
(0.0000)

Cash-to-Assets

22808

0.399

0.271

0.350

174580

0.127

0.173

0.060

-.273
(0.0000)

Investment-to-Assets

22347

0.049

0.068

0.029

170942

0.072

0.082

0.048

.022
(0.0000)

Asset Sale-to-Assets

22808

0.065

0.326

0.000

174580

0.020

0.121

0.000

-.045
(0.0000)

EBITDA-to-Assets

22547

0.031

0.383

0.097

173671

0.091

0.201

0.121

.060
(0.0000)

Share Repurchases-to-Assets

22808

0.019

0.075

0.000

174580

0.011

0.058

0.000

-.008
(0.0000)

Taxes Paid-to-Assets

22652

0.035

0.068

0.017

174193

0.026

0.044

0.019

-.009
(0.0000)

Tangibility

22783

0.165

0.183

0.097

174255

0.316

0.229

0.265

.150
(0.0000)

R&D-to-Sales

21435

5.102

134.113

0.033

173313

1.052

74.827

0.000

-4.050
(0.0000)

Variable
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TABLE 1.3: AZL DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
This table reports several descriptive statistics for a sample of 197,388 yearly observations from 1965 to 2017. For
each variable, the observations’ number, mean, median, standard deviation are reported. Total assets and equity
capitalization are reported in million USD. Values for the number of employees are reported in million units. The
last column reports the difference between the mean value of almost-zero-leveraged and leveraged firms. The
numbers in parentheses are p-values associated with the parametric two-sample t-test.
Almost Zero Leverage Firms

Leveraged Firms

Significance tests

Obs.

Mean

SD

Median

Obs.

Mean

SD

Median

Difference in
means

Leverage Ratio

45754

0.010

0.014

0.000

151634

0.345

0.293

0.293

.336
(0.0000)

Total Assets

45754

482

4666

73.942

151634

1881

12972

125.803

1398.78
(0.0000)

Equity Capitalization

42086

1185

12357

132.133

134551

1976

12680

86.454

791.543
(0.0000)

Age

45754

18.859

13.240

16.000

151634

22.829

15.237

20.000

3.971
(0.0000)

Number of Employees

45349

3.706

23.055

0.461

150218

9.390

39.045

1.589

5.684
(0.0000)

Market-to-Book Ratio

42024

2.693

3.217

1.933

134249

1.654

4.260

1.348

-1.039
(0.0000)

Sales Growth

39483

0.122

0.564

0.103

138594

0.111

0.404

0.088

-.012
(0.0000)

Sales-to-Assets

45742

1.173

1.350

0.985

151594

1.342

1.066

1.182

.169
(0.0000)

Dividend Binary Variable

45754

0.302

0.459

0.000

151634

0.430

0.495

0.000

.128
(0.0000)

Dividend-to-Assets

45740

0.017

0.077

0.000

151612

0.011

0.042

0.000

-.006
(0.0000)

Cash Flow-to-Assets

42864

0.025

0.251

0.080

137067

0.051

0.170

0.077

.026
(0.0000)

Cash-to-Assets

45754

0.348

0.263

0.284

151634

0.101

0.143

0.050

-.247
(0.0000)

Investment-to-Assets

44938

0.054

0.066

0.035

148351

0.074

0.084

0.049

.020
(0.0000)

Asset Sale-to-Assets

45754

0.049

0.271

0.000

151634

0.018

0.103

0.000

-.031
(0.0000)

EBITDA-to-Assets

45375

0.046

0.329

0.107

150843

0.096

0.189

0.122

.050
(0.0000)

Share Repurchases-to-Assets

45754

0.016

0.076

0.000

151634

0.010

0.055

0.000

-.006
(0.0000)

Taxes Paid-to-Assets

45560

0.036

0.062

0.021

151285

0.024

0.041

0.018

-.011
(0.0000)

Tangibility

45703

0.184

0.183

0.122

151335

0.333

0.230

0.285

.149
(0.0000)

R&D-to-Sales

43939

3.647

99.313

0.019

150809

0.871

78.216

0.000

-2.776
(0.0000)

Variable
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higher for leveraged firms. Moreover, age denotes the total years since a firm’s
information first appeared in Compustat over the period from 1965 to 2017. The
average age of leveraged firms is about 22.5 years, whereas it is only 18 years for
unleveraged firms. Further, it seems that ZL firms are in general high growth firms.
ZL firms have, on average, a market-to-book ratio of 2.8, whereas leveraged firms’
market-to-book ratio is 1.8. Additionally, relative to leveraged firms, unleveraged
firms do not often pay dividends. But, when unleveraged firms do pay dividends, they
are expected to pay higher dividends compared to leveraged firms. These findings are
consistent with Strebulaev and Yang (2013) who report that unleveraged dividendpaying firms effectively replace payout to debt-holders with payout to equity-holders.
In summary, compared to levered firms, unlevered firms are on average smaller
and younger. They are also less likely to have greater revenue, revenue growth, cash
flows, investments, and fixed tangible assets; but they are more likely to have greater
growth opportunities, dividends, cash holdings, asset sales, tax expenses, and R&D
expenses. Table 3 indicates that AZL firms exhibit patterns similar to those of ZL
firms.
Table 4 reports the coefficient values of a two-way-interacted regression. The
dependent variable for columns one to four is the change in the cash-to-assets ratio.
ZL is a binary variable that equals one if a firm-year observation is unlevered and
zero otherwise. In this two-way interacted regression, the coefficient on cash-flow-toassets on columns one to four signifies the cash-to-cash-flow sensitivity for leveraged
firms, and the sum of this coefficient and the coefficient on the ZL binary variable
interacted with cash-flow-to-assets denotes the sensitivity for unleveraged firms. For
example, column one indicates that levered firms’ cash-to-cash-flow sensitivity equals
6.75, while the sensitivity for unlevered firms equals 5.7 or (6.75 plus -1.05). Hence,
consistent with our first hypothesis, the results show that the interacted coefficient
is negative and is statistically significant, signifying that unlevered firms have a
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TABLE 1.4: ZL TWO-WAY-INTERACTED-REGRESSIONS
This table displays estimates of several two-way-interacted-regressions in which the dependent variables are the
change in the cash-to-assets’ ratio in columns one to four, and capital-expenditure-to-assets’ ratio in columns five
to eight. ZL (zero leverage) is a binary variable that equals one if a firm-year observation is unlevered and zero
otherwise. The coefficients on cash-flow-to-assets signify the sensitivities for leveraged firms. The coefficients on
cash-flow-to-assets interacted with the ZL binary variable signify the change in the sensitivities for unleveraged
firms. Year and sector fixed effects are included in all equations. Estimates with superscripts ***, **, and * have
a statistical significance level of one percent, five percent, and ten percent, respectively.
Dependent Variable
Regression

Δ in Cash-to-Assets

Investment-to-Assets

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

ZL × Cash Flow-to-Assets

-1.0451***

-1.0431***

-1.7501***

-1.6406***

-0.0083***

-0.0172***

-0.0194***

-0.0176***

Cash Flow-to-Assets

6.7540***

6.7312***

5.6798***

5.2667***

0.0451***

0.0648***

0.0322***

0.0356***

ZL

0.1037***

0.1017***

0.1967***

0.1570***

-0.0011**

-0.0032***

-0.0033***

-0.0110***

ln (Total Assets)

0.0721***

0.0745***

0.1080***

0.1337***

-0.0127***

-0.0173***

-0.0166***

-0.0157***

ln (Equity Capitalization)

-0.0664***

-0.0687***

-0.1039***

-0.1300***

0.0126***

0.0136***

0.0128***

0.0106***

Age

0.0008***

0.0008***

0.0008***

0.0007***

-0.0003***

-0.0003***

-0.0003***

-0.0003***

0.0008

0.0006

-0.0026

-0.0041

0.0000

0.0037***

0.0036***

0.0053***

Market-to-Book Ratio

-0.0196***

-0.0195***

-0.0235***

-0.0214***

-0.0003***

-0.0005***

-0.0004***

-0.0005***

Sales Growth

0.4593***

0.4601***

0.3916***

0.3665***

0.0115***

0.0114***

0.0105***

0.0108***

-0.0041

-0.0035

-0.0201***

-0.0088**

0.0014***

-0.0050***

-0.0054***

-0.0046***

Dividend Binary Variable

-0.0612***

-0.0635***

-0.0735***

-0.0060***

-0.0026***

-0.0027***

Dividend-to-Assets

-0.6663***

-0.6646***

-0.7458***

-0.0209***

-0.0201***

-0.0252***

Cash-to-Assets

-0.3583***

-0.3591***

-0.2533***

-0.0071***

-0.0547***

-0.0496***

Investment-to-Assets

-1.5919***

-1.6255***

-1.5464***

Asset Sale-to-Assets

0.0493***

0.0498***

0.0127***

0.0098***

EBITDA-to-Assets

-1.3772***

-1.4623***

-0.0364***

-0.0377***

Share Repurchases-to-Assets

-0.6041***

-0.6074***

-0.0161***

-0.0189***

Taxes Paid-to-Assets

-0.3830***

0.0524***

Tangibility

-0.0468**

0.1915***

R&D-to-Sales

-0.0386**

0.0000***

Observations

108,622

108,673

108,811

109,686

151,613

151,747

151,999

152,000

R-squared

0.1976

0.1973

0.1772

0.1626

0.4599

0.3354

0.3312

0.3226

ln (Number of Employees)

Sales-to-Assets
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TABLE 1.5: AZL TWO-WAY-INTERACTED-REGRESSIONS
This table displays estimates of several two-way-interacted-regressions in which the dependent variables are the
change in the cash-to-assets’ ratio in columns one to four, and capital-expenditure-to-assets’ ratio in columns five
to eight. AZL (almost-zero-leverage) is a binary variable that equals one if a firm-year observation has a leverage
ratio below 5% and zero otherwise. The coefficients on cash-flow-to-assets signify the sensitivities for leveraged
firms. The coefficients on cash-flow-to-assets interacted with the AZL binary variable signify the change in the
sensitivities for AZL firms. Year and sector fixed effects are included in all equations. Estimates with superscripts
***, **, and * have a statistical significance level of one percent, five percent, and ten percent, respectively.
Dependent Variable
Regression

Δ in Cash-to-Assets

Investment-to-Assets

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

AZL × Cash Flow-to-Assets

-0.8005***

-0.8029***

-1.3079***

-1.1796***

-0.0087***

-0.0157***

-0.0185***

-0.0142***

Cash Flow-to-Assets

6.8265***

6.8064***

5.7704***

5.3342***

0.0465***

0.0673***

0.0354***

0.0378***

AZL

0.0530***

0.0512***

0.1191***

0.0889***

-0.0004

-0.0039***

-0.0037***

-0.0111***

ln (Total Assets)

0.0682***

0.0702***

0.1031***

0.1278***

-0.0127***

-0.0175***

-0.0169***

-0.0164***

ln (Equity Capitalization)

-0.0639***

-0.0659***

-0.1008***

-0.1256***

0.0126***

0.0138***

0.0130***

0.0113***

Age

0.0008***

0.0008***

0.0008***

0.0007***

-0.0003***

-0.0003***

-0.0003***

-0.0003***

0.0015

0.0013

-0.0016

-0.0037

0.0000

0.0037***

0.0036***

0.0052***

Market-to-Book Ratio

-0.0197***

-0.0197***

-0.0236***

-0.0216***

-0.0003***

-0.0005***

-0.0004***

-0.0005***

Sales Growth

0.4589***

0.4600***

0.3928***

0.3672***

0.0115***

0.0113***

0.0104***

0.0108***

-0.0037

-0.0029

-0.0195***

-0.0084**

0.0014***

-0.0049***

-0.0053***

-0.0045***

Dividend Binary Variable

-0.0609***

-0.0630***

-0.0728***

-0.0061***

-0.0026***

-0.0027***

Dividend-to-Assets

-0.6945***

-0.6923***

-0.7886***

-0.0212***

-0.0205***

-0.0255***

Cash-to-Assets

-0.3303***

-0.3293***

-0.2247***

-0.0073***

-0.0530***

-0.0480***

Investment-to-Assets

-1.5999***

-1.6347***

-1.5536***

Asset Sale-to-Assets

0.0504***

0.0508***

0.0127***

0.0097***

EBITDA-to-Assets

-1.3854***

-1.4590***

-0.0363***

-0.0374***

Share Repurchases-to-Assets

-0.6150***

-0.6180***

-0.0164***

-0.0195***

Taxes Paid-to-Assets

-0.3361***

0.0530***

Tangibility

-0.0465**

0.1915***

R&D-to-Sales

-0.0462

0.0000***

Observations

108,622

108,673

108,811

109,686

151,613

151,747

151,999

152,000

R-squared

0.1977

0.1974

0.1766

0.1619

0.4599

0.3357

0.3315

0.3239

ln (Number of Employees)

Sales-to-Assets
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lower cash-to-cash-flow sensitivity (i.e., unlevered firms are less financially
constrained).
We also report investment-to-cash-flow sensitivities on columns five to eight,
where the dependent variable for these columns is the investment-to-assets ratio.
Similar to the first four columns, the coefficients on cash-flow-to-assets on the last
four columns denote the investment-to-cash-flow sensitivity for leveraged firms,
while the sum of this coefficient and the interacted coefficient represents the
sensitivity for unleveraged firms. Column five indicates that levered firms’
investment-to-cash-flow sensitivity equals 0.0451, whereas the sensitivity for
unlevered firms equals 0.0368 or (0.0451 plus -0.0083). The results are statistically
significant and supports our first hypothesis. Table 5 documents similar evidence for
AZL firms.
Table 6 reports the coefficient values of a three-way-interacted-multivariate
regression. Similar to tables 4, the first four columns signify the cash flow sensitivity
of cash while the last four columns signify the cash flow sensitivity of investment.
But, in tables 6, we are testing whether the ZL effect on cash- and investment-tocash-flow sensitivities is different for larger firms compared to smaller firms. To do
that, we include a third-interacted binary variable, Large, that equals one if a firmyear has total assets greater than average and zero otherwise. In this specification, a

negative three-way-interacted-coefficient implies that the ZL effect on a firm’s
financial constraints is weaker for larger firms, while a positive coefficient suggests
a stronger effect. Consistent with our second hypothesis, the findings show that the
three-way-interacted-coefficient is negative and is statistically significant across all
eight columns. This implies that the ZL effect on firms’ cash- and investment-to-cashflow sensitivities is weaker for larger firms relative to smaller firms. Table 7 reports
consistent evidence for AZL firms.
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TABLE 1.6: ZL MULTIVARIATE-REGRESSIONS WITH LARGE AS THE THIRD BINARY VARIABLE
This table displays estimates of several three-way-interacted-multivariate-regressions in which the dependent
variables are the change in the cash-to-assets’ ratio in columns one to four, and capital-expenditure-to-assets’ ratio
in columns five to eight. ZL (zero leverage) is a binary variable that equals one if a firm-year observation is
unlevered and zero otherwise. Large is a binary variable that equals one if a firm-year has total assets greater
than average and zero otherwise. A negative three-way-interacted-coefficient implies that the ZL effect on
sensitivities is weaker for larger firms, whereas a positive coefficient suggests a stronger effect. Year and sector
fixed effects are included in all equations. Estimates with superscripts ***, **, and * have a statistical significance
level of one percent, five percent, and ten percent, respectively.
Dependent Variable
Regression

Δ in Cash-to-Assets

Investment-to-Assets

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

Cash Flow-to-Assets

6.4922***

6.4666***

5.4746***

5.0530***

0.0387***

0.0476***

0.0216***

0.0246***

ZL

0.0448**

0.0421**

0.0494**

0.0099

0.0001

-0.0031***

-0.0034***

-0.0112***

-0.6299***

-0.6280***

-0.8415***

-0.8516***

-0.0065***

-0.0138***

-0.0147***

-0.0137***

-0.0066

-0.0045

0.0416***

0.0600***

-0.0067***

-0.0110***

-0.0111***

-0.0111***

Large × Cash Flow-to-Assets

0.4366***

0.4308***

0.1240*

0.0000

0.0244***

0.0678***

0.0710***

0.0709***

Large × ZL

0.0739***

0.0726***

0.2259***

0.1974***

0.0018*

0.0061***

0.0073***

0.0089***

Large × ZL × Cash Flow-to-Assets

-0.6455***

-0.6384***

-1.5576***

-1.2553***

-0.0119**

-0.0208***

-0.0302***

-0.0300***

ln (Equity Capitalization)

-0.0355***

-0.0371***

-0.0586***

-0.0745***

0.0074***

0.0064***

0.0059***

0.0043***

Age

0.0009***

0.0008***

0.0009***

0.0008***

-0.0003***

-0.0003***

-0.0003***

-0.0003***

ln (Number of Employees)

0.0292***

0.0302***

0.0414***

0.0520***

-0.0055***

-0.0040***

-0.0037***

-0.0018***

Market-to-Book Ratio

-0.0267***

-0.0270***

-0.0342***

-0.0350***

0.0007***

0.0008***

0.0009***

0.0007***

Sales Growth

0.4567***

0.4572***

0.3778***

0.3468***

0.0123***

0.0127***

0.0121***

0.0124***

Sales-to-Assets

-0.0169***

-0.0169***

-0.0418***

-0.0352***

0.0037***

-0.0019***

-0.0023***

-0.0018***

Dividend Binary Variable

-0.0638***

-0.0667***

-0.0782***

-0.0058***

-0.0022***

-0.0024***

Dividend-to-Assets

-0.6949***

-0.6931***

-0.8170***

-0.0200***

-0.0196***

-0.0240***

Cash-to-Assets

-0.3818***

-0.3853***

-0.2833***

-0.0033***

-0.0489***

-0.0450***

Investment-to-Assets

-1.6498***

-1.6894***

-1.6394***

Asset Sale-to-Assets

0.0573***

0.0585***

0.0115***

0.0081***

EBITDA-to-Assets

-1.4399***

-1.5495***

-0.0332***

-0.0287***

Share Repurchases-to-Assets

-0.6073***

-0.6108***

-0.0188***

-0.0254***

Taxes Paid-to-Assets

-0.4757***

0.0722***

Tangibility

-0.0526***

0.1941***

R&D-to-Sales

-0.0415

0.0000***

Observations

108,622

108,673

108,811

109,686

151,613

151,747

151,999

152,000

R-squared

0.1966

0.1962

0.1747

0.1580

0.4532

0.3250

0.3218

0.3147

ZL × Cash Flow-to-Assets
Large
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TABLE 1.7: AZL MULTIVARIATE-REGRESSIONS WITH LARGE AS THE THIRD BINARY VARIABLE
This table displays estimates of several three-way-interacted-multivariate-regressions in which the dependent
variables are the change in the cash-to-assets’ ratio in columns one to four, and capital-expenditure-to-assets’ ratio
in columns five to eight. AZL (almost-zero-leverage) is a binary variable that equals one if a firm-year observation
has a leverage ratio below 5% and zero otherwise. Large is a binary variable that equals one if a firm-year has
total assets greater than average and zero otherwise. A negative three-way-interacted-coefficient implies that the
AZL effect on sensitivities is weaker for larger firms, whereas a positive coefficient suggests a stronger effect. Year
and sector fixed effects are included in all equations. Estimates with superscripts ***, **, and * have a statistical
significance level of one percent, five percent, and ten percent, respectively.
Dependent Variable
Regression

Δ in Cash-to-Assets

Investment-to-Assets

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

6.4644***

6.4428***

5.5000***

5.0724***

0.0392***

0.0487***

0.0232***

0.0257***

-0.0180

-0.0204

-0.0067

-0.0368**

0.0017***

-0.0023***

-0.0023***

-0.0101***

AZL × Cash Flow-to-Assets

-0.2742***

-0.2774***

-0.5408***

-0.5133***

-0.0064***

-0.0118***

-0.0129***

-0.0099***

Large

-0.0240**

-0.0220*

0.0271**

0.0465***

-0.0070***

-0.0117***

-0.0119***

-0.0123***

Large × Cash Flow-to-Assets

0.6235***

0.6180***

0.2479***

0.1025

0.0269***

0.0719***

0.0757***

0.0752***

Large × AZL

0.0930***

0.0922***

0.1753***

0.1527***

0.0018**

0.0055***

0.0063***

0.0079***

Large × AZL × Cash Flow-to-Assets

-0.8671***

-0.8653***

-1.3031***

-1.0559***

-0.0141***

-0.0229***

-0.0305***

-0.0289***

ln (Equity Capitalization)

-0.0350***

-0.0363***

-0.0572***

-0.0716***

0.0073***

0.0064***

0.0059***

0.0045***

Age

0.0009***

0.0009***

0.0009***

0.0008***

-0.0003***

-0.0003***

-0.0003***

-0.0003***

ln (Number of Employees)

0.0280***

0.0287***

0.0398***

0.0485***

-0.0055***

-0.0039***

-0.0037***

-0.0020***

Market-to-Book Ratio

-0.0263***

-0.0265***

-0.0337***

-0.0343***

0.0007***

0.0008***

0.0009***

0.0007***

Sales Growth

0.4569***

0.4578***

0.3795***

0.3479***

0.0123***

0.0127***

0.0121***

0.0124***

Sales-to-Assets

-0.0157***

-0.0154***

-0.0398***

-0.0330***

0.0037***

-0.0019***

-0.0023***

-0.0017***

Dividend Binary Variable

-0.0635***

-0.0661***

-0.0772***

-0.0058***

-0.0023***

-0.0024***

Dividend-to-Assets

-0.7289***

-0.7265***

-0.8492***

-0.0205***

-0.0204***

-0.0248***

Cash-to-Assets

-0.3458***

-0.3460***

-0.2399***

-0.0049***

-0.0491***

-0.0452***

Investment-to-Assets

-1.6533***

-1.6952***

-1.6405***

Asset Sale-to-Assets

0.0585***

0.0596***

0.0114***

0.0080***

EBITDA-to-Assets

-1.4504***

-1.5446***

-0.0330***

-0.0283***

Share Repurchases-to-Assets

-0.6226***

-0.6257***

-0.0188***

-0.0257***

Taxes Paid-to-Assets

-0.4128***

0.0715***

Tangibility

-0.0534***

0.1942***

R&D-to-Sales

-0.0484

0.0000***

Observations

108,622

108,673

108,811

109,686

151,613

151,747

151,999

152,000

R-squared

0.1971

0.1967

0.1745

0.1579

0.4533

0.3250

0.3219

0.3151

Cash Flow-to-Assets
AZL
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TABLE 1.8: ZL MULTIVARIATE-REGRESSIONS WITH DIVIDEND AS THE THIRD BINARY VARIABLE
This table displays estimates of several three-way-interacted-multivariate-regressions in which the dependent
variables are the change in the cash-to-assets’ ratio in columns one to four, and capital-expenditure-to-assets’ ratio
in columns five to eight. ZL (zero leverage) is a binary variable that equals one if a firm-year observation is
unlevered and zero otherwise. Dividend is a binary variable that equals one if a firm-year has paid dividends and
zero otherwise. A negative three-way-interacted-coefficient implies that the ZL effect on sensitivities is weaker for
dividend paying firms, whereas a positive coefficient suggests a stronger effect. Year and sector fixed effects are
included in all equations. Estimates with superscripts ***, **, and * have a statistical significance level of one
percent, five percent, and ten percent, respectively.
Dependent Variable
Regression

Δ in Cash-to-Assets

Investment-to-Assets

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

6.7405***

6.7323***

5.8073***

5.4402***

0.0429***

0.0558***

0.0232***

0.0260***

0.0240

0.0234

0.1818***

0.1413***

0.0002

-0.0020***

-0.0019***

-0.0100***

ZL × Cash Flow-to-Assets

-0.5047***

-0.5091***

-1.7015***

-1.5406***

-0.0046**

-0.0105***

-0.0121***

-0.0112***

Dividend

-0.0757***

-0.0731***

-0.0418***

-0.0354***

-0.0080***

-0.0123***

-0.0126***

-0.0119***

-0.0379

-0.0791

-0.4753***

-0.4428***

0.0197***

0.0960***

0.0977***

0.0871***

Dividend × ZL

0.2289***

0.2249***

0.0624**

0.0700**

-0.0024

0.0037**

0.0032*

0.0048***

Dividend × ZL × Cash Flow-to-Assets

-1.5020***

-1.4799***

-0.3407**

-0.3143*

-0.0206**

-0.0686***

-0.0709***

-0.0679***

ln (Total Assets)

0.0729***

0.0751***

0.1076***

0.1313***

-0.0126***

-0.0164***

-0.0158***

-0.0134***

ln (Equity Capitalization)

-0.0668***

-0.0689***

-0.1035***

-0.1204***

0.0124***

0.0129***

0.0120***

0.0104***

Age

0.0008***

0.0008***

0.0008***

0.0012***

-0.0003***

-0.0003***

-0.0003***

-0.0003***

0.0010

0.0008

-0.0018

-0.0046

0.0000

0.0036***

0.0035***

0.0038***

Market-to-Book Ratio

-0.0204***

-0.0204***

-0.0245***

-0.0233***

-0.0004***

-0.0006***

-0.0005***

-0.0007***

Sales Growth

0.4635***

0.4640***

0.3956***

0.3546***

0.0115***

0.0116***

0.0107***

0.0107***

Sales-to-Assets

-0.0046

-0.0040

-0.0206***

0.0014***

-0.0052***

-0.0056***

Cash-to-Assets

-0.3596***

-0.3601***

-0.2527***

-0.0076***

-0.0562***

-0.0512***

Investment-to-Assets

-1.5866***

-1.6188***

-1.5341***

Asset Sale-to-Assets

0.0462***

0.0467***

0.0127***

0.0098***

EBITDA-to-Assets

-1.4043***

-1.4812***

-0.0360***

-0.0371***

Share Repurchases-to-Assets

-0.5952***

-0.5979***

-0.0170***

-0.0238***

Taxes Paid-to-Assets

-0.3576***

0.0484***

Tangibility

-0.0444**

0.1910***

R&D-to-Sales

-0.0368***

0.0000***

Observations

108,623

108,674

108,812

109,686

151,614

151,748

152,000

152,000

R-squared

0.1975

0.1972

0.1765

0.1645

0.4599

0.3378

0.3337

0.3234

Cash Flow-to-Assets
ZL

Dividend × Cash Flow-to-Assets

ln (Number of Employees)
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TABLE 1.9: AZL MULTIVARIATE-REGRESSIONS WITH DIVIDEND AS THE THIRD BINARY VARIABLE
This table displays estimates of several three-way-interacted-multivariate-regressions in which the dependent
variables are the change in the cash-to-assets’ ratio in columns one to four, and capital-expenditure-to-assets’ ratio
in columns five to eight. AZL (almost-zero-leverage) is a binary variable that equals one if a firm-year observation
has a leverage ratio below 5% and zero otherwise. Dividend is a binary variable that equals one if a firm-year has
paid dividends and zero otherwise. A negative three-way-interacted-coefficient implies that the AZL effect on
sensitivities is weaker for dividend paying firms, whereas a positive coefficient suggests a stronger effect. Year
and sector fixed effects are included in all equations. Estimates with superscripts ***, **, and * have a statistical
significance level of one percent, five percent, and ten percent, respectively.
Dependent Variable
Regression

Δ in Cash-to-Assets

Investment-to-Assets

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

6.7553***

6.7478***

5.8431***

5.4573***

0.0435***

0.0576***

0.0256***

0.0280***

-0.0143

-0.0151

0.0922***

0.0587***

0.0010**

-0.0029***

-0.0026***

-0.0107***

AZL × Cash Flow-to-Assets

-0.3083***

-0.3127***

-1.1178***

-0.9572***

-0.0047**

-0.0102***

-0.0123***

-0.0103***

Dividend

-0.0914***

-0.0892***

-0.0566***

-0.0521***

-0.0079***

-0.0122***

-0.0126***

-0.0122***

0.1008

0.0667

-0.3388***

-0.2991***

0.0223***

0.0983***

0.1005***

0.0905***

Dividend × AZL

0.1981***

0.1960***

0.0941***

0.1063***

-0.0026**

0.0016

0.0013

0.0040***

Dividend × AZL × Cash Flow-to-Assets

-1.3890***

-1.3803***

-0.6540***

-0.6681***

-0.0175**

-0.0460***

-0.0488***

-0.0488***

ln (Total Assets)

0.0689***

0.0707***

0.1029***

0.1257***

-0.0126***

-0.0167***

-0.0161***

-0.0142***

ln (Equity Capitalization)

-0.0644***

-0.0661***

-0.1006***

-0.1163***

0.0124***

0.0131***

0.0122***

0.0111***

Age

0.0008***

0.0008***

0.0008***

0.0012***

-0.0003***

-0.0003***

-0.0003***

-0.0003***

0.0019

0.0017

-0.0007

-0.0044

0.0001

0.0036***

0.0036***

0.0038***

Market-to-Book Ratio

-0.0206***

-0.0206***

-0.0247***

-0.0234***

-0.0004***

-0.0006***

-0.0005***

-0.0007***

Sales Growth

0.4632***

0.4641***

0.3970***

0.3550***

0.0115***

0.0115***

0.0107***

0.0106***

Sales-to-Assets

-0.0046

-0.0038

-0.0203***

0.0014***

-0.0051***

-0.0055***

Cash-to-Assets

-0.3323***

-0.3312***

-0.2253***

-0.0081***

-0.0544***

-0.0497***

Investment-to-Assets

-1.5903***

-1.6237***

-1.5396***

Asset Sale-to-Assets

0.0473***

0.0478***

0.0127***

0.0098***

EBITDA-to-Assets

-1.4132***

-1.4781***

-0.0359***

-0.0368***

Share Repurchases-to-Assets

-0.6066***

-0.6090***

-0.0173***

-0.0243***

Taxes Paid-to-Assets

-0.3056***

0.0495***

Tangibility

-0.0438**

0.1910***

R&D-to-Sales

-0.0416

0.0000***

Observations

108,623

108,674

108,812

109,686

151,614

151,748

152,000

152,000

R-squared

0.1976

0.1974

0.1760

0.1640

0.4600

0.3380

0.3339

0.3246

Cash Flow-to-Assets
AZL

Dividend × Cash Flow-to-Assets

ln (Number of Employees)
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Similar to table 6, table 8 also reports the coefficient values of a three-wayinteracted-multivariate regression with the first four columns denoting the cash-tocash-flow sensitivity and the last four columns denoting the investment-to-cash-flow
sensitivity. But, in tables 8, we are testing whether the ZL effect is different for
dividend-paying firms relative to zero-dividend firms. Here, our third-interaction
binary variable, Dividend, equals one if a firm-year has paid dividends and zero
otherwise. Consistent with our third hypothesis, the findings indicate that the threeway-interacted-coefficient is negative and is statistically significant across all eight
columns, implying that the ZL effect on firms’ financial constraints is weaker for
dividend-paying firms. Table 9 also documents a statistically significant weaker AZL
effect on firms’ financial constraints for dividend-paying firms.
Our third-interaction variable for table 10 is a binary variable that equals one if
a firm-year has a fixed-assets-to-assets ratio greater than average, and zero
otherwise. Consistent with our fourth hypothesis, the results reveal that the threeway-interacted-coefficient is negative and is statistically significant across all eight
columns, indicating that the ZL effect on firms’ financial constraints is weaker for
firms with greater proportions of fixed tangible assets. Interestingly, the coefficient
on the ZL binary variable interacted with cash-flow-to-assets on columns five to eight
lost its statistical significance when we added the third-interacted variable Tangible.
This signifies the importance of tangibility in shaping the relationship between the
ZL behavior and investment-to-cash-flow sensitivity. Also, table 11 suggests evidence
consistent with our fourth hypothesis for AZL firms. Finally, the results in table 12
and 13 show that the three-way-interacted-coefficient is negative and is statistically
significant across all eight columns, indicating that the ZL and AZL effects on firms’
financial constraints is weaker for value firms.
Our main results are robust to many alternative specifications, including (1) using
subsamples that exclude the years of the global financial crisis, (2) using different
measures of leverage, (3) using different explanatory variable combinations.
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TABLE 1.10: ZL MULTIVARIATE-REGRESSIONS WITH TANGIBLE AS THE THIRD BINARY VARIABLE
This table displays estimates of several three-way-interacted-multivariate-regressions in which the dependent
variables are the change in the cash-to-assets’ ratio in columns one to four, and capital-expenditure-to-assets’ ratio
in columns five to eight. ZL (zero leverage) is a binary variable that equals one if a firm-year observation is
unlevered and zero otherwise. Tangible is a binary variable that equals one if a firm-year has a fixed-assets-toassets ratio greater than average and zero otherwise. A negative three-way-interacted-coefficient implies that the
ZL effect on sensitivities is weaker for tangible firms, whereas a positive coefficient suggests a stronger effect.
Year and sector fixed effects are included in all equations. Estimates with superscripts ***, **, and * have a
statistical significance level of one percent, five percent, and ten percent, respectively.
Dependent Variable
Regression

Δ in Cash-to-Assets

Investment-to-Assets

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

Cash Flow-to-Assets

6.9465***

6.9380***

6.8624***

6.5707***

0.0352***

0.0333***

0.0329***

0.0315***

ZL

0.1290***

0.1284***

0.1299***

0.0842***

-0.0030***

-0.0029***

-0.0025***

-0.0081***

ZL × Cash Flow-to-Assets

-1.2226***

-1.2267***

-1.2304***

-1.2757***

0.0017

0.0020

0.0020

0.0010

Tangible

0.0337***

0.0352***

0.0328***

0.0037

0.0450***

0.0450***

0.0450***

0.0472***

Tangible × Cash Flow-to-Assets

-0.5178***

-0.5186***

-0.4862***

-0.6902***

0.0587***

0.0598***

0.0595***

0.0548***

Tangible × ZL

0.1243***

0.1206***

0.1174***

0.1638***

0.0057***

0.0059***

0.0056***

0.0085***

Tangible × ZL × Cash Flow-to-Assets

-0.8415***

-0.8216***

-0.8020***

-0.8969***

-0.0249***

-0.0246***

-0.0242***

-0.0266***

ln (Total Assets)

0.0716***

0.0736***

0.0731***

0.1019***

-0.0129***

-0.0134***

-0.0134***

-0.0117***

ln (Equity Capitalization)

-0.0645***

-0.0667***

-0.0673***

-0.0905***

0.0126***

0.0130***

0.0130***

0.0117***

Age

0.0008***

0.0008***

0.0008***

0.0013***

-0.0003***

-0.0003***

-0.0003***

-0.0003***

Market-to-Book Ratio

-0.0200***

-0.0201***

-0.0210***

-0.0229***

-0.0005***

-0.0004***

-0.0005***

-0.0006***

Sales Growth

0.4565***

0.4564***

0.4664***

0.4312***

0.0119***

0.0117***

0.0118***

0.0118***

-0.0022

-0.0028

-0.0039

0.0103***

-0.0027***

-0.0025***

-0.0026***

-0.0017***

EBITDA-to-Assets

-1.3658***

-1.4209***

-1.4615***

1.3910***

-0.0383***

-0.0335***

-0.0339***

-0.0281***

Dividend Binary Variable

-0.0593***

-0.0603***

-0.0609***

-0.0680***

-0.0056***

-0.0052***

-0.0052***

-0.0059***

Dividend-to-Assets

-0.7915***

-0.7852***

-0.7523***

-0.0320***

-0.0308***

-0.0301***

Cash-to-Assets

-0.3650***

-0.3742***

-0.3716***

-0.0351***

-0.0339***

-0.0331***

Investment-to-Assets

-1.5162***

-1.5127***

-1.4899***

Asset Sale-to-Assets

0.0505***

0.0499***

0.0110***

0.0109***

Share Repurchases-to-Assets

-0.5955***

-0.5994***

-0.0183***

-0.0162***

Taxes Paid-to-Assets

-0.2653***

0.0483***

R&D-to-Sales

-0.0385

0.0000***

Observations

109,652

109,655

109,655

110,531

152,945

152,953

152,953

152,954

R-squared

0.1962

0.1962

0.1945

0.1815

0.3933

0.3926

0.3919

0.3881

Sales-to-Assets
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TABLE 1.11: AZL MULTIVARIATE-REGRESSIONS WITH TANGIBLE AS THE THIRD BINARY VARIABLE
This table displays estimates of several three-way-interacted-multivariate-regressions in which the dependent
variables are the change in the cash-to-assets’ ratio in columns one to four, and capital-expenditure-to-assets’ ratio
in columns five to eight. AZL (almost-zero-leverage) is a binary variable that equals one if a firm-year observation
has a leverage ratio below 5% and zero otherwise. Tangible is a binary variable that equals one if a firm-year has
a fixed-assets-to-assets ratio greater than average and zero otherwise. A negative three-way-interacted-coefficient
implies that the AZL effect on sensitivities is weaker for tangible firms, whereas a positive coefficient suggests a
stronger effect. Year and sector fixed effects are included in all equations. Estimates with superscripts ***, **, and
* have a statistical significance level of one percent, five percent, and ten percent, respectively.
Dependent Variable
Regression

Δ in Cash-to-Assets

Investment-to-Assets

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

Cash Flow-to-Assets

7.0665***

7.0601***

6.9731***

6.6940***

0.0351***

0.0329***

0.0325***

0.0315***

AZL

0.0818***

0.0808***

0.0820***

0.0398***

-0.0031***

-0.0029***

-0.0027***

-0.0083***

AZL × Cash Flow-to-Assets

-1.0110***

-1.0141***

-0.9963***

-1.0217***

0.0019

0.0025

0.0025

0.0026

Tangible

0.0372***

0.0384***

0.0354***

0.0022

0.0445***

0.0444***

0.0444***

0.0460***

Tangible × Cash Flow-to-Assets

-0.5474***

-0.5478***

-0.5046***

-0.7285***

0.0597***

0.0607***

0.0604***

0.0561***

Tangible × AZL

0.0673***

0.0659***

0.0645***

0.1001***

0.0053***

0.0056***

0.0054***

0.0086***

Tangible × AZL × Cash Flow-to-Assets

-0.4918***

-0.4851***

-0.4912***

-0.5284***

-0.0184***

-0.0176***

-0.0175***

-0.0190***

ln (Total Assets)

0.0683***

0.0698***

0.0694***

0.0949***

-0.0130***

-0.0135***

-0.0134***

-0.0121***

ln (Equity Capitalization)

-0.0621***

-0.0637***

-0.0645***

-0.0849***

0.0126***

0.0131***

0.0130***

0.0120***

Age

0.0009***

0.0009***

0.0009***

0.0013***

-0.0003***

-0.0003***

-0.0003***

-0.0003***

Market-to-Book Ratio

-0.0201***

-0.0202***

-0.0211***

-0.0232***

-0.0005***

-0.0005***

-0.0005***

-0.0006***

Sales Growth

0.4562***

0.4565***

0.4667***

0.4318***

0.0119***

0.0118***

0.0118***

0.0118***

-0.0018

-0.0021

-0.0033

0.0108***

-0.0027***

-0.0025***

-0.0026***

-0.0017***

EBITDA-to-Assets

-1.3731***

-1.4125***

-1.4542***

-1.3947***

-0.0383***

-0.0335***

-0.0340***

-0.0288***

Dividend Binary Variable

-0.0581***

-0.0588***

-0.0593***

-0.0689***

-0.0056***

-0.0052***

-0.0052***

-0.0060***

Dividend-to-Assets

-0.8568***

-0.8512***

-0.8182***

-0.0326***

-0.0314***

-0.0306***

Cash-to-Assets

-0.3388***

-0.3461***

-0.3458***

-0.0343***

-0.0332***

-0.0325***

Investment-to-Assets

-1.5221***

-1.5197***

-1.4966***

Asset Sale-to-Assets

0.0514***

0.0507***

0.0109***

0.0109***

Share Repurchases-to-Assets

-0.6068***

-0.6099***

-0.0186***

-0.0164***

Taxes Paid-to-Assets

-0.1993***

0.0487***

R&D-to-Sales

-0.0479

0.0000***

Observations

109,652

109,655

109,655

110,531

152,945

152,953

152,953

152,954

R-squared

0.1961

0.1960

0.1943

0.1813

0.3933

0.3926

0.3919

0.3885

Sales-to-Assets
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TABLE 1.12: ZL MULTIVARIATE-REGRESSIONS WITH VALUE AS THE THIRD BINARY VARIABLE
This table displays estimates of several three-way-interacted-multivariate-regressions in which the dependent
variables are the change in the cash-to-assets’ ratio in columns one to four, and capital-expenditure-to-assets’ ratio
in columns five to eight. ZL (zero leverage) is a binary variable that equals one if a firm-year observation is
unlevered and zero otherwise. Value is a binary variable that equals one if a firm-year has a market-to-book ratio
lower than average and zero otherwise. A negative three-way-interacted-coefficient implies that the ZL effect on
sensitivities is weaker for value firms, whereas a positive coefficient suggests a stronger effect. Year and sector
fixed effects are included in all equations. Estimates with superscripts ***, **, and * have a statistical significance
level of one percent, five percent, and ten percent, respectively.
Dependent Variable
Regression

Δ in Cash-to-Assets

Investment-to-Assets

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

Cash Flow-to-Assets

0.4567***

0.4505***

0.4329***

0.4314***

0.0153***

0.0317***

0.0314***

0.0306***

ZL

-0.0155***

-0.0122***

-0.0145***

-0.0150***

-0.0031***

-0.0124***

-0.0123***

-0.0123***

-0.0027

-0.0018

-0.0056

-0.0089*

-0.0052**

-0.0086***

-0.0084***

-0.0096***

Value

-0.0141***

-0.0158***

-0.0133***

-0.0132***

-0.0080***

-0.0034***

-0.0034***

-0.0033***

Value × Cash Flow-to-Assets

0.2011***

0.1947***

0.1961***

0.1979***

0.0062***

0.0269***

0.0275***

0.0281***

Value × ZL

0.0052**

0.0067***

0.0066***

0.0065***

0.0069***

0.0026**

0.0026***

0.0025**

Value × ZL × Cash Flow-to-Assets

-0.0625***

-0.0547***

-0.0465***

-0.0450***

-0.0166***

-0.0384***

-0.0389***

-0.0386***

ln (Total Assets)

-0.0034***

-0.0037***

-0.0007

-0.0003

-0.0107***

-0.0101***

-0.0102***

-0.0100***

ln (Equity Capitalization)

-0.0057***

-0.0056***

-0.0088***

-0.0090***

0.0102***

0.0099***

0.0100***

0.0099***

Age

0.0001**

0.0001**

0.0000

0.0000

-0.0002***

-0.0002***

-0.0002***

-0.0002***

Sales Growth

0.0413***

0.0410***

0.0405***

0.0408***

0.0106***

0.0104***

0.0106***

0.0106***

Sales-to-Assets

-0.0081***

-0.0067***

-0.0085***

-0.0085***

0.0015***

-0.0025***

-0.0025***

-0.0025***

Dividend Binary Variable

-0.0120***

-0.0134***

-0.0158***

-0.0185***

-0.0061***

-0.0023***

-0.0023***

-0.0034***

Dividend-to-Assets

-0.0804***

-0.0770***

-0.0864***

-0.0330***

-0.0353***

-0.0347***

Asset Sale-to-Assets

-0.0049***

-0.0023

-0.0033*

0.0132***

0.0062***

0.0059***

Share Repurchases-to-Assets

-0.0711***

-0.0694***

-0.0177***

-0.0233***

Taxes Paid-to-Assets

-0.2744***

-0.2707***

0.0222***

0.0130***

Tangibility

-0.0672***

0.1925***

R&D-to-Sales

0.0001***

0.0001***

Observations

151,765

152,001

152,011

152,012

153,000

153,215

153,225

153,226

R-squared

0.2965

0.2920

0.2857

0.2850

0.4511

0.3165

0.3162

0.3157

ZL × Cash Flow-to-Assets
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TABLE 1.13: AZL MULTIVARIATE-REGRESSIONS WITH VALUE AS THE THIRD BINARY VARIABLE
This table displays estimates of several three-way-interacted-multivariate-regressions in which the dependent
variables are the change in the cash-to-assets’ ratio in columns one to four, and capital-expenditure-to-assets’ ratio
in columns five to eight. AZL (almost-zero-leverage) is a binary variable that equals one if a firm-year observation
is unlevered and zero otherwise. Value is a binary variable that equals one if a firm-year has a market-to-book
ratio lower than average and zero otherwise. A negative three-way-interacted-coefficient implies that the AZL
effect on sensitivities is weaker for value firms, whereas a positive coefficient suggests a stronger effect. Year and
sector fixed effects are included in all equations. Estimates with superscripts ***, **, and * have a statistical
significance level of one percent, five percent, and ten percent, respectively.
Dependent Variable
Regression

Δ in Cash-to-Assets

Investment-to-Assets

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

Cash Flow-to-Assets

0.4745***

0.4683***

0.4530***

0.4515***

0.0146***

0.0306***

0.0303***

0.0295***

AZL

-0.0065***

-0.0029***

-0.0050***

-0.0053***

-0.0024***

-0.0126***

-0.0124***

-0.0124***

AZL × Cash Flow-to-Assets

-0.0491***

-0.0496***

-0.0567***

-0.0585***

-0.0013

-0.0001

0.0005

-0.0003

Value

-0.0139***

-0.0158***

-0.0131***

-0.0130***

-0.0094***

-0.0042***

-0.0043***

-0.0042***

Value × Cash Flow-to-Assets

0.2013***

0.1941***

0.1923***

0.1942***

0.0176***

0.0407***

0.0415***

0.0422***

0.0001

0.0013

0.0006

0.0006

0.0075***

0.0042***

0.0041***

0.0041***

Value × AZL × Cash Flow-to-Assets

-0.0371***

-0.0295***

-0.0173**

-0.0167*

-0.0389***

-0.0612***

-0.0620***

-0.0621***

ln (Total Assets)

-0.0036***

-0.0035***

-0.0008*

-0.0004

-0.0107***

-0.0108***

-0.0109***

-0.0108***

ln (Equity Capitalization)

-0.0057***

-0.0058***

-0.0088***

-0.0090***

0.0101***

0.0105***

0.0106***

0.0105***

Age

0.0001**

0.0001**

0.0000

0.0000

-0.0002***

-0.0002***

-0.0002***

-0.0002***

Sales Growth

0.0414***

0.0411***

0.0407***

0.0409***

0.0106***

0.0103***

0.0105***

0.0106***

Sales-to-Assets

-0.0078***

-0.0065***

-0.0082***

-0.0082***

0.0016***

-0.0024***

-0.0024***

-0.0025***

Dividend Binary Variable

-0.0123***

-0.0138***

-0.0162***

-0.0188***

-0.0063***

-0.0025***

-0.0024***

-0.0035***

Dividend-to-Assets

-0.0795***

-0.0758***

-0.0851***

-0.0333***

-0.0363***

-0.0356***

Asset Sale-to-Assets

-0.0057***

-0.0031*

-0.0041**

0.0130***

0.0061***

0.0058***

Share Repurchases-to-Assets

-0.0731***

-0.0709***

-0.0180***

-0.0248***

Taxes Paid-to-Assets

-0.2691***

-0.2670***

0.0215***

0.0168***

Tangibility

-0.0678***

0.1926***

R&D-to-Sales

0.0001***

0.0000***

Observations

151,765

152,001

152,011

152,012

153,000

153,215

153,225

153,226

R-squared

0.2972

0.2926

0.2865

0.2858

0.4515

0.3183

0.3180

0.3174

Value × AZL
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Moreover, to control for the potential survival-ship bias, we break our sample into
several subsamples with shorter time periods. The results are consistent with our
main empirical evidence. Furthermore, endogeneity concerns that arise from omitted
variables are very common in empirical corporate finance studies. One possible
remedy to the endogeneity problem is the use of a fixed effects model. A fixed-effect
can

capture

any

unobservable,

low-frequency

independent

variable

(e.g.,

unobservable technological differences). To address the endogeneity problem, we
include firm- and year-specific intercepts in all our regressions and our main results
hold.
To sum up, the empirical evidence of this paper suggests that leverage is a major
factor escalating firms' financial constraints, signifying that this escalation is more
pronounced for firms in their early lifecycle. The results could potentially explain the
rising zero leverage behavior of US firms over the past four decades. That is, firms
may follow conservative debt policies to lower their financial constraints. Other
related explanations for the rising zero leverage behavior that have been documented
in the literature include economic cycle effects (Cantor, 1990; Bernanke et al., 1994;
Opler and Titman, 1994; and Phillips, 1995), asset liquidation respects (Shleifer and
Vishny, 1992), and ownership considerations (Strebulaev and Yang, 2013).
Cantor (1990) and Opler and Titman (1994) imply that firms with high leverage
are more susceptible to adverse economic shocks. These shocks may force them to cut
back sharply on employment or investments. Firm with low leverage will
correspondingly pick up their slack. Consistent with these studies, Bernanke et al.
(1994) develop the autoregressive financial accelerator theory in which adverse
exogenous shocks lower current cash flows and raises investment costs. This reduces
investment spending and cash flows in later periods, proliferating the initial adverse
shock. The financial accelerator effects are stronger, the deeper the economic
downturn and the higher the leverage ratio. In this view, Phillips (1995) posits a
model in which rivals with superior access to capital might increase output and
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sustain losses to drive highly leveraged firms into insolvency. Bolton and Scharfstein
(1990) suggest that the best response to predation is to lower firms’ financial
constraints.
Shleifer and Vishny (1992) explain that when a financially distressed firm try to
sell its corporate assets during downturns, other potential buyers in the industry are
expected to experience similar problems. Even if not, industry regulations may
prevent them from buying distressed corporate assets. This magnifies the costs of
financial distress which are associated with leverage. Moreover, declines in asset
liquidity and debt capacity will reinforce each other since asset liquidity relies on debt
capacity, and debt capacity depends on liquidity. As a result, highly-leveraged firms
will probably survive only when corporate assets remain liquid. Lastly, Strebulaev
and Yang (2013) suggest that family-owned and manager-owned firms are likely to
have lower levels of leverage. This is because the owners if these firms are expected
to be under-diversified and have a desire for long-term survival.
6. Conclusion:
This paper started by highlighting some of the theories explaining why firms may
be financially constrained and discussing some of the empirical studies documenting
that certain firm characteristics could potentially mitigate the severity of a firm’s
financial constraints. Several testable hypotheses are then suggested. Namely, the
study proposes that unleveraged firms are expected to face lower financial constraints
relative to leveraged firms and that the zero-leverage effect on firms’ financial
constraints is more likely to be stronger for smaller firms, zero-dividend firms, firms
with lower proportions of tangible assets, and growth firms.
Indeed, the findings of this study support the hypotheses proposed. Using a large
dataset of yearly firm observations that spans from 1965 to 2017, the empirical
results also show an astonishing remarkable growing ZL behavior of publicly-traded
US firms over the past four decades. The results are consistent with the debt
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overhang theory which explains how leverage may have negative effects on a firm’s
value by increasing its financial constraints and weakening its ability to undertake
profitable future investments. Finally, the findings are also consistent with the large
body of literature suggesting that small firms, zero-dividend firms, firms with low
tangibility, and growth firms face greater financial distress and bankruptcy
likelihoods. Hence, these firm’s financial constraint levels are more susceptible to
their leverage levels compared to larger firms, dividend-paying firms, firms with high
tangibility, and value firms, respectively.
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CHAPTER 2
A New Model for Screening Shariah Compliant Firms
1. Introduction:
When investing in the equity capital markets, countries and investors who choose
to adhere to the Shariah law often apply a set of qualitative and quantitative screens
to exclude equity firms that are Shariah-incompliant. Qualitative screens are sector
screens through which firms primarily operating within specific Shariahimpermissible industries (e.g., tobacco products and alcoholic beverages) are
excluded. Implementing sector screens is relatively straightforward and only exclude
a small portion of equity firms. Firms that satisfy the qualitative screens are subject
to quantitative financial screens through which only firms that are involved in a
negligible impermissible activity (e.g., minor interest payments or occasional sale of
liquor) are deemed as Shariah-compliant. Those with impermissible activities
exceeding a subjectively-specified threshold are considered Shariah-incompliant.
Unlike sector screens, financial screens are vague and apply to roughly all equity
firms because almost all firms are involved in interest payments.
Although there exists an overwhelming consensus among Shariah experts that
interest is a grave and sinful act in Islam, a large number of contemporary Shariah
experts argue that minor impermissible acts do not render the whole firm as
impermissible. The rationale behind this view is that it is almost impossible to find a
firm that is fully Shariah-compliant in today’s equity capital markets. Even if there
are a few, they are not sufficient to absorb all the wealth of Shariah-compliant
investors and they will probably be concentrated in small regions of the world putting
the wealth of Shariah-compliant investors at a very high risk (DeLorenzo, 2000). In
addition to that, Shariah-compliant equity investors are in most cases minority
investors with limited control and voting power. If a shareholder objects an
impermissible contract, but his objection was overruled by a majority vote, one cannot
conclude that the contract was approved by that shareholder (Derigs and Marzban,
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2008). Hence, investing in some Shariah-incompliant firms became permissible due
to the absence of the ideal alternative and because there is a need that must be
satisfied with the lowest harm and highest benefit. Investors are required, however,
to express their disapproval against impermissible dealings and to purify their
earnings from any impermissible income.
Based on the above view, a number of Shariah-compliant equity funds and index
providers have emerged11. Most of them follow similar criteria in implementing sector
screens. Remarkable discrepancies, however, exist between the different financial
screens. This is mainly because specifying the threshold of non-negligible
impermissible acts is purely subjective. For example, regarding the ratio of interestbearing debt to total assets, a wide threshold dispersion ranging from 25 to 50 percent
exist among the different financial screening guidelines. Beside the remarkable
discrepancies, using thresholds to classify firms as “Shariah-compliant” or “Islamic”
is problematic. Take the threshold of 33 percent for the debt-to-assets ratio as an
example. This threshold implies that firms with a debt ratio of 34 percent are
Shariah-incompliant, whereas firms with a debt ratio of 32 percent are indeed
Shariah-compliant. It also implies that firms with a 15 percent debt ratio are as
compliant as firms with a 5 percent debt ratio. The reality is that none of the
referenced firms are fully compliant, but some are more compliant (i.e., less Shariahsinful) than others.
The wide variations in the current Shariah-compliant equity screening practices
have resulted in conflicted and inconsistent classifications, leaving the Shariahcompliant investors confused and discouraged. Moreover, with today's modern
technology and big data analytics, one can easily build up models for Shariahcompliant investors that maximizes the benefits and minimizes the harms of

These include for example the Dow Jones Islamic Index, Financial Times Islamic Index, Standard
& Poor’s Islamic Index, Morgan Stanley Capital International Islamic Index, Dubai Islamic Bank
Fund, and HSBC Amanah Fund.
11
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investing and participating in the world’s equity capital markets. Thus, the
development of an integrated screening framework that is customizable and
understandable will surely enrich the reliability and practicality of the Shariahcompliant equity investments.
This paper posits the Weighted Average Shariah-Compliance Percentile
(hereafter: WASC). This measure reflects the extent to which a firm adheres to
Shariah relative to the other firms located in a certain region at a certain time. The
WASC is a financial quantitative measure that ranges from zero to one and only
applies to firms that satisfy the sector screens. Firms whose core business is
impermissible are initially excluded and are deemed as Shariah-incompliant. Each
firm that satisfies the sector screens is then given various percentile ranks. These
ranks are then used to calculate the WASC. A firm with a 90% US WASC in 2015 is
more Shariah-compliant than 90% of all US firms in 2015. This simple number
provides the Shariah-compliant investor with a clear precise understanding of the

relative compliance status of each firm he wishes to invest in. Hence, it is more
Shariah-appropriate than the use of thresholds. Also, this single numeric figure can
be easily incorporated into portfolio optimization models.
Section three provides a detailed overview and analysis of all the optional formats
used to customize the WASC. The WASC can be customized by specifying the set of
financial ratios, the dataset, and the weight for each of its various accounts. Current
screening practitioners do not all use the same set of financial ratios when carrying
out the quantitative screens. For example, there is a debate among Shariah experts
as to whether use market or accounting book values to value the worth of a firm,
where this value is used as a divisor for various financial ratios (Nisar and
Khatkhatay, 2006). Specification of the dataset is also necessary because the WASC
is a relative percentile measure. Since some equity funds may be limited to investing
their asset base across certain regions, each equity fund may have distinctive
datasets. Although the availability of multiple formats impairs the consistency of
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equity screens, it accommodates all the existing views of Shariah experts. It can also
be designed to be consistent with each portfolio’s objectives and constraints, making
the WASC suitable and applicable to a wide number of Shariah-compliant equity
investors. There cannot be a unified format of the WASC simply because investors
will always have different objectives, constraints, and views about the appropriate
set of financial ratios and weights. Hence, it is expected that each screening
practitioner may have distinctive sets of weights, financial ratios, datasets, and
WASC values.
Finally, the paper presents illustrative results using a sample of all publicly
traded US firms from the year 2010 to 2016. The results are discussed and compared
across different firms, years, sets of weights, and sets of financial ratios. The results
indicate that firms with considerable amounts of monetary assets and liabilities will
show varying WASC values depending on whether book or market values are used as
ratio divisors. Moreover, the use of different sets of WASC weights may have
significant effects on the WASC if there are large discrepancies between the various
percentile accounts used to calculate the WASC. Lastly, the results suggest a
negative relationship between each account ratio and its percentile that varies from
account to another due to the changing aggregate firm behavior over time.
Section 2 briefly highlights the current Shariah-compliant equity screening
practices. Section 3 analyzes all the formats used to customize the WASC. Section 4
presents a general case of the WASC. Section 5 reports the results, and section 6
concludes.
2. Current Equity Screening Practices:
All Shariah-compliant equity investors start their screens by excluding firms that
primarily operate within specific impermissible industries (e.g., tobacco products and
alcoholic beverages). There are three main industry classification codes used to carry
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TABLE 2.1: SHARIAH INCOMPLIANT INDUSTRY CODES
This table reports the different codes for industries that are deemed as Shariah incompliant by most Shariah compliant
screening practitioners. x denotes all discrete numbers from 0 to 9. xx denotes all discrete numbers from 0 to 99. xxxx
denotes all discrete numbers from 0 to 9999. SIC (Standard Industry Classification) is developed in 1937 by the US
government. GICS (Global Industry Classification Standard) is developed in 1999 by Standard & Poor’s and MSCI. For
more information, see the Dow Jones Islamic Market Indices Methodology (2018), MSCI Islamic Index Series Methodology
(2015), S&P Shariah Indices Methodology (2018), and FTSE Shariah Global Equity Index Series (2018).
Panel A: SIC codes:
SIC Code

Incompliant Industries

SIC Code

Incompliant Industries

0132

Tobacco Farming

60xx

Depository Institutions

0213

Hog and Pig Farming

61xx

Nondepository Credit Institutions

2013

Sausage Products

62xx

Security & Commodity Brokers

2082

Breweries

63xx

Insurance Carriers

2084

Wineries

64xx

Insurance Agents Brokers & Service

2085

Distilleries

6797

Mortgage Institutions

21xx

Tobacco Products Manufacturers

6798

Mortgage Institutions

5181

Beer and Ale Merchant Wholesalers

7011

Casino Hotels

5182

Alcoholic Beverage Merchant Wholesalers

78xx

Motion Pictures

5194

Tobacco Merchant Wholesalers

791x

Dance Studios

5735

Musical Instrument and Supplies Stores

792x

Theatrical Producers

5736

Musical Instrument and Supplies Stores

866x

Religious Organizations

5813

Alcoholic Beverages

93xx

Public Finance

5921

Beer, Wine, and Liquor Stores

9711

Weapon Related Establishments

5993

Tobacco Stores

Panel B: GICS codes:
GICS Code

Incompliant Industries

GICS Code

Incompliant Industries

20101010

Aerospace & Defense

30201010

Brewers

25301010

Casinos & Gaming

30201020

Distillers & Vintners

25301020

Hotels, Resorts & Cruise Lines

30203010

Tobacco

25301040

Restaurants

4010xxxx

Banks

25401020

Broadcasting

4020xxxx

Diversified Financials

25401025

Cable & Satellite

4030xxxx

Insurance

25401030

Movies & Entertainment
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out the sector screens: GICS, ICB, and SIC12. The benefit of using the SIC is that a
firm may have multiple SIC codes based on its different business activities, whereas
only one GICS and ICB code is assigned to each firm based on its core-business
activity (Derigs and Marzban, 2008). Table 1 shows the different SIC codes for
industries that are deemed as Shariah incompliant. Firms that satisfy the sector
screens are subject to quantitative financial screens. In these screens, firms that are
involved in impermissible financial contracts exceeding a subjectively-specified
threshold are considered Shariah-incompliant.
Most Shariah-compliant equity investors apply four sets of quantitative financial
screens: interest, debt, liquidity, and impermissible income screens13. Interest and
debt screens merely focus on investigating the level of interest-bearing investments
and finances, respectively. Since Shariah experts concur that interest is
impermissible, lower threshold discrepancies are found in the different contemporary
debt and interest screens relative to the monetary and impermissible income screens.
Impermissible income screens focus on investigating the level of earnings
generated from Shariah-incompliant activities. It can be applied, for instance, to an
airline company to measure the amount of income generated from alcohol sales. Such
screens are less-frequently used by screening practitioners. This is probably because
sector screens are already conducted and because current accounting standards do
not require firms to disclose all income source elements. If the impermissible revenue
is significant, it will most likely be reflected in the sector classifications (e.g., SIC
codes). One can always conduct a thorough investigation of each firm’s revenue

SIC (Standard Industry Classification) is developed in 1937 by the US government. GICS (Global
Industry Classification Standard) is developed in 1999 by Standard & Poor’s and MSCI. ICB (Industry
Classification Benchmark) is developed in 2005 by Dow Jones and FTSE.
13 See the Dow Jones Islamic Market Indices Methodology (2018), MSCI Islamic Index Series
Methodology (2015), S&P Shariah Indices Methodology (2018), and FTSE Shariah Global Equity Index
Series (2018). More information about these is available in the references. Also, see Derigs and
Marzban (2008) for a comprehensive review of the Shariah-compliant equity screening practices.
12
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sources, but such an investigation is costly and impractical, especially because the
reliability of the results is as good as the disclosures.
Liquidity or monetary screens focus on investigating the level of monetary
assets14. Because not all Shariah experts have same views regarding the
permissibility of monetary assets, a larger threshold dispersion is found among the
different contemporary monetary screens. To understand why Shariah favors nonmonetary assets (e.g., inventory and PP&E) over monetary assets (e.g., cash and cash
equivalents, short- and long-term debt investments, and accounts relievable),
consider these two rather extreme examples. If a firm holds cash as its only asset,
then the total value of the firm's outstanding shares must equal the total value of
cash held. This is because, according to Shariah, when money is traded with money,
the trade must be exactly equal15. Similarly, if a firm holds accounts receivables and
marketable securities as its only assets, then purchasing shares from that firm is
viewed as purchasing debt. Shariah clearly prohibits the purchase or sale of any debt,
whether it involves interest or not. Shariah experts all agree upon the restrictions
involved in purchasing solo monetary assets, but they have different views in
attributing the stock price to the monetary assets. The least restrictive view suggests
that as long as (1) a firm holds non-monetary assets and (2) the total value of the
firm's outstanding shares is in excess of total monetary assets, the firm is deemed as
Shariah-compliant, because the excess value can be attributed to the non-monetary
assets (Nisar and Khatkhatay, 2006).
Similar arguments that apply to monetary assets also apply to monetary
liabilities. Specifically, all Shariah experts agree upon the restrictions involved in

Monetary assets are assets that involve the right to receive a determinable amount of currency units.
By the same token, monetary liabilities are liabilities that involve the obligation to deliver a
determinable amount of currency units. Most Shariah-compliant equity investors use the term ‘liquid’
assets as opposed to ‘monetary’ assets. The accounting term ‘liquid’ is inappropriate in this context
because it includes inventory and excludes long-term interest-bearing investments. The more
appropriate and relevant accounting terminology is using the term ‘monetary’.
15 According to Shariah, the trade also must be instant.
14
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TABLE 2.2: DEBT, INTEREST, IMPERMISSIBLE INCOME, AND MONETARY RATIOS
This table presents the main debt, interest, impermissible income, and monetary ratios used by the major Shariah-compliant
equity funds and Islamic index providers. Market capitalization is the total market value of a firm's outstanding common
shares at a certain time. Cash denotes cash and cash equivalents.

Debt Ratios

Interest Ratios

Impermissible
Income Ratios

Monetary Ratios

First Ratio

𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠

𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠

𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒

𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠

Second
Ratio

𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛

𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛

-

𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛

Third Ratio

-

𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠

-

𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 + 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠

Fourth
Ratio

-

𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛

-

𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 + 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛

Sixth Ratio

-

𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
+ 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠

-

𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 +
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠

Seventh
Ratio

-

𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
+ 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛

-

𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 +
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛

Eighth
Ratio

-

𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒

-

-
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selling any solo debt obligations, but they have different views in carrying the debt
obligations on the common stockholders. The least restrictive view suggests that due
to the limited liability feature of publicly traded companies, the sale of a firm common
stock is independent of the firm’s debt obligations (Nisar and Khatkhatay, 2006).
3. Specifying the Ratios, the Dataset, and the Weights:

3.1. Specifying the Ratios:
Table 2 presents the main debt, interest, impermissible income, and monetary
ratios used by the major Shariah-compliant equity funds and Islamic index providers.
3.1.1. Book and Market Firm Value:
One major cause of the ratio variations presented in table 2 is the disagreement
over the variable representing the worth of a firm, where this variable is used as a
divisor for the various financial ratios. Some funds and indexes use market
capitalization16 as a ratio divisor. But market capitalization may lead to undesirable
performances for the Shariah-compliant investor when stocks are mispriced17.
Specifically, overpriced stocks will falsely appear more Shariah-compliant whereas
underpriced stocks will inaccurately appear less Shariah-compliant, leaving
investors who try to optimize their degree of Shariah-compliance misled and
disadvantaged18.
Also, there is a large body of the corporate finance literature suggesting that the
amount of corporate leverage collateralized by existing assets will be more than is
collateralized by future growth, holding other things equal. Myers (1977) explains
why managers often set firms’ target leverage ratios relative to book as opposed to

Or average monthly market capitalization to smooth the measure and eliminate any seasonality
effects.
17 While there is an ongoing debate over asset price drivers, both behavioral- and rational-based asset
pricing theories tend to agree on the view that there may be temporary price deviations from the
fundamental or efficient price.
18 The empirical results in section five provide more discussion as to why the use of market value as
a ratio divisor may disadvantage Shariah-compliant investors.
16
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market values. He states: “it is not that book values are more accurate than stock
market values, but simply that they refer to assets already in place. A significant part
of many firms’ market values is accounted for by assets not yet in place (i.e., by the
present value of future growth opportunities).” Myers’ (1977) debt overhang theory
explains how corporate leverage can reduce firms’ value by weakening their incentive
to undertake good future investments. Consistent with the debt overhang theory, a
number of empirical studies document that leverage is negatively associated with
firms’ market value and with future growth (e.g., Cai and Zhang (2011), Ahn et al.
(2006), Aivazian and Qiu (2005), Lang et al. (1996), McConnell and Servaes (1995)).
These studies imply that leverage should not be measured relative to market values
because growth decreases with leverage and is not yet realized.
In summary, the use of market capitalization is advantageous in that it is
independent of accounting standards discrepancies and reflects the market value of
the firm, but the use of market capitalization can be: (1) inappropriate because it
majorly accounts for future growth opportunities that are not yet realized, (2)
disadvantageous when stocks are mispriced, (3) unstable when prices are volatile,
and (4) irrelevant when prices are driven by external market factors. To reduce the
effect of price volatility, some investors use average monthly market capitalization to
smooth the measure.
The worth of a firm can alternatively be accounted for using total book asset value.
Indeed, book values tend to be stable and reflect assets already in place, but book
values are more susceptible to accounting standards discrepancies and reporting
biases. To reduce the effects of accounting standards discrepancies, time must be
spent in correcting for the accounting practice differences between the countries.
Rajan and Zingales (1995) analyze the different accounting practices of multiple
countries and point to the modifications required so that leverage measures can be
internationally comparable. Alternatively, one can simply use distinctive datasets for
each country to avoid the effects of accounting standards discrepancies.
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3.1.2. Monetary Assets and Liabilities:
Another main cause of ratio dissimilarity presented in table 2 is the specification
of monetary and interest-bearing assets used to calculate monetary and interest
ratios, respectively. Clearly, there is a noticeable overlap in the monetary and
interest ratios. This is because all interest-bearing assets are also monetary assets 19.
It is also important to note that some monetary assets are more Shariah-incompliant
than others. For example, monetary assets that earn greater interest (e.g., bonds) are
more Shariah-incompliant than monetary assets that earn less interest (e.g.,
certificates of deposit) or zero interest (e.g., some accounts receivables). In general,
long-term interest-based investments and liabilities are more likely to be more
Shariah-incompliant than short-term interest-based investments and liabilities. This
is because long-term interest-based investments and liabilities imply the intent of
holding these incompliant deals for longer time periods. Also, interest-yields often
increase with maturity because investors often demand higher interest rates for
longer-term riskier investments.
To account for this matter, interest and monetary screens can be combined and
represented by one measure. This measure can be calculated as a weighted average
of several monetary asset accounts with greater weights assigned to the more
Shariah-incompliant monetary asset accounts20. The general formula for the
weighted average monetary assets percentile at time t for firm i can be represented
as:

𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑊𝐼𝐵𝐼 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐵𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑊𝐶 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑊𝑅 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡

(1)

But not all monetary assets (e.g., some accounts receivable) are interest-bearing assets.
All sorts of short- and long-term equity investments (e.g., equity stocks, investments in associates)
are non-monetary assets.
19
20
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Where Interest Bearing Investments denote the monetary investments percentile. It
reflects the relative rate to which a firm coincide with Shariah in that lower
proportions of its total assets are interest-bearing investments. 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ denotes the cash
and cash equivalents percentile and reflects the relative degree to which a firm
complies with Shariah in that lower proportions of its total assets are recorded as
cash and cash equivalents. 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 denotes the receivables percentile and reflects
the relative extent to which a firm is more Shariah-compliant in that lower
proportions of its total assets are documented as receivables. 𝑊𝐼𝐵𝐼 , 𝑊𝐶 , and 𝑊𝑅 denote
the weights of the monetary investments percentile, cash and cash equivalents
percentile, and receivables percentile, respectively.
Panel A in table three presents the different monetary asset ratios used to
calculate the monetary investments percentile, cash and cash equivalents percentile,
and receivables percentile. Long-term interest-bearing investments can include
investments in bonds and long-term note receivable. Short-term interest-bearing
investments can include investments in certificates of deposit, commercial papers,
and short-term notes.
Debt screens can also be decomposed and calculated as a weighted average of
several monetary liability accounts with greater weights assigned to the more
Shariah-incompliant monetary liability accounts. The general formula for the
weighted average monetary liabilities percentile at time t for firm i can be
represented as:

𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑊𝐿𝐷 𝐿𝑇 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑊𝑆𝐷 𝑆𝑇 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑊𝑃 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡

(2)

Where 𝐿𝑇 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 and 𝑆𝑇 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 denote the long- and short-term debt percentile. They
reflect the relative level to which a firm is more Shariah-consistent in that lower
proportions of its total liability and equity are classified as long- and short-term debt.
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 denotes the payables percentile and reflects the relative scale to which a
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TABLE 2.3: MONETARY ASSET AND LIABILITY RATIOS
Panel A presents the different monetary asset ratios used to calculate the long- and short-term interest-bearing investments
percentiles, cash and cash equivalents percentile, and receivables percentile. Panel B presents the different monetary liability
ratios used to calculate the long-term debt, short-term debt, and payables percentiles. Panel C presents the different financial
margins used to calculate the interest income, interest expense, and impermissible income percentiles. Market capitalization
is the total market value of a firm's outstanding common shares at a certain time. Average market capitalization is the average
monthly market capitalization over a certain time period. Total interest-bearing investments can include investments in
bonds, certificates of deposit, commercial papers, and notes. Cash denotes cash and cash equivalents. Receivables can include
trade receivables and other current receivables. Total long-term debt can include corporate bonds, capitalized lease obligations,
non-convertible debt, and other long-term debt. Total short-term debt can include current portion of long-term debt,
commercial papers, convertible debt and other short-term debt. Payables can include accounts payable and income taxes
payable.

Panel A: Monetary Asset Ratios:
Interest-bearing Investment
Ratios

Cash Ratios

Receivables Ratios

Using Total Assets

LT and ST Interest bearing Inves.
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠

𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠

𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠

Using Market
Capitalization

LT and ST Interest bearing Inves.
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛

𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛

𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛

Using Average Market
Capitalization

LT and ST Interest bearing Inves.
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙.

𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙.

𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙.

Long Term Debt Ratios

Short Term Debt Ratios

Payables Ratios

Using Total Assets

𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠

𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠

𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠

Using Market
Capitalization

𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛

𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛

𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛

Using Average Market
Capitalization

𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙.

𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙.

𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙.

Interest Income Margin

Interest Expense Margin

Impermissible Income Margin

𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒

𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒

𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒

Panel B: Monetary Liability Ratios:

Panel C: Income Statement Margins:
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firm adheres to Shariah in that lower proportions of its total liability and equity are
recorded as payables. 𝑊𝐿𝐷 , 𝑊𝑆𝐷 , and 𝑊𝑃 denote the weights of the long-term debt
percentile, short-term debt percentile, and payables percentile, respectively.
Panel B in table three presents the different monetary liability ratios used to
calculate the long-term debt, short-term debt, and payables percentiles. Long-term
debt can include corporate bonds, capitalized lease obligations, non-convertible debt,
and other long-term debt. Short-term debt can include current portion of long-term
debt, commercial papers, convertible debt, and other short-term debt. Payables can
include accounts payable and income taxes payable.
In addition to monetary assets and liabilities screens, other secondary screens
may include interest revenue and expense screens and impermissible income screens.
Unlike monetary asset and liability screens, interest screens focus on gauging and
verifying interest revenue and expense levels using a firm’s income statement, as
opposed to using a firm’s balance sheet. Impermissible income screens can also be
used to verify the level of engagements in impermissible acts, other than interest,
that are not captured by the sector screens. Panel C in table three presents the
different financial margins used to calculate the interest income, interest expense,
and impermissible income percentiles.
One major limitation of using these secondary screens is that firms tend to not
report their insignificant revenue and expense constituents in their financial
statements. Hence, these screens may require a thorough investigation of all the
sources of each firm’s revenues and expenses. But such investigations may not be
robust and practical, especially because current accounting standards do not require
detailed disclosers of all the revenue and expense elements.
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3.2. Specifying the Dataset:
Since the WASC is a relative measure, the dataset must be distinctively specified.
The dataset can be all publicly traded companies in one country, multiple countries,
one continent, multiple continents, or the entire globe. Due to economic or political
reasons, some Shariah-compliant equity funds may be restricted from investing their
asset base in certain countries or sectors. Also, for diversification purposes, some
equity funds may initially allocate certain proportions of their asset base across
different countries or sectors. Hence, each screening practitioner may have
distinctive datasets that are consistent with his objectives and constraints or may
have multiple datasets, one for each country or sector21.

3.3. Specifying the Weights:
The general rule is that greater weights should be assigned to the accounts that
are (1) more agreed-upon by Shariah experts, (2) more Shariah-incompliant, and (3)
more reliably measured.
4. The Model:
Using equations (1) and (2), the general formula for the WASC at time t for firm i
can be represented as:

𝑊𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑊𝑀𝐿 × (𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ) + 𝑊𝑀𝐴 × (𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ) + 𝑊𝐼𝑅𝐸 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑅/𝐸𝑖,𝑡 (3)

0r:

𝑊𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑊𝑀𝐿 × (𝑊𝐿𝐷 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑊𝑆𝐷 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑊𝑃 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ) + 𝑊𝑀𝐴 ×
(𝑊𝐼𝐵𝐼 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐵𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑊𝐶 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑊𝑅 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ) + 𝑊𝐼𝑅𝐸 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑅/𝐸𝑖,𝑡 (4)

Where I𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑅/𝐸 denotes the interest revenue and expense percentile and
reflects the relative rate to which a firm comply with Shariah in that it has lower
21

Having multiple datasets can be useful to avoid the effects of accounting standards discrepancies.
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interest revenue and expense margins in its income statement. 𝑊𝑀𝐿 , 𝑊𝑀𝐴 , 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑊𝐼𝑅𝐸
denote the weights of the weighted average monetary assets percentile, the weighted
average monetary liabilities percentile, and the interest revenue and expense
percentile, respectively.
To calculate a percentile, its relevant financial ratios are calculated for all firms
in a specific region at a specific year. For each ratio (e.g., long-term debt to assets
ratio), firms with a ratio of zero are initially excluded and are immediately given a
percentile of 100%. Firms with a ratio higher than zero are counted and ranked
numerically from bottom to top based on their ratio value. Following the Allen Hazen
(1869–1930) mothed, the percentile of ratio r22 at time t for firm i can be represented
as:

𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑟,𝑖,𝑡 =

𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑟,𝑖,𝑡 − 0.5
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑎 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑟,𝑡

(5)

5. Illustrative Results:
To illustrate the use of the WASC, we use merged annual Compustat and CRSP
datasets for all publicly traded firms in the United States over the period from 2010
to 2016. The SIC codes presented in table one are used to exclude all firms primarily
operating within Shariah-impermissible industries. This resulted in excluding about
22% of our sample database. On the date each firm reports its annual financial
statements, market capitalization is calculated as share price times total shares
outstanding. Average market capitalization is the average monthly market
capitalization over the twelve months prior to each firm’s annual reporting date. All
the ratios in table three are then calculated using total book assets, market
capitalization, and average monthly market capitalization as ratio divisors. To get an
idea of how using different ratio divisors can affect our main financial ratios, we

22

Ratio r can be any of the ratios presented in table 3 (e.g., long-term debt to assets ratio).
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TABLE 2.4: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
This table reports several descriptive statistics for a sample of 19,960 yearly observations from 2010 to 2016. For
each ratio, the observations’ number, mean, median, standard deviation are reported. The last column reports
the difference in ratio means. The numbers in parentheses are p-values associated with the parametric two-sample
t-test.
Panel A: Total Assets and Market Capitalization as Ratio Divisors:
Total Assets as a Ratio Divisor

Market Capitalization as a Ratio Divisor

Significance tests

Obs.

Mean

SD

Median

Obs.

Mean

SD

Median

Difference in
means

Interest Bearing Inv.

19756

0.0740

0.1552

0.0032

19756

0.0559

0.1200

0.0031

0.0181
(0.0000)

Cash

19685

0.1676

0.1951

0.1025

19685

0.1375

0.1557

0.0865

0.0301
(0.0000)

Receivables

19300

0.1207

0.1092

0.0996

19300

0.1421

0.1713

0.0825

-0.0214
(0.0000)

Monetary Asset

18353

0.3647

0.2580

0.3012

18353

0.2967

0.2172

0.2387

0.0680
(0.0000)

LT Debt

18086

0.1555

0.1743

0.1056

18086

0.1800

0.2345

0.0775

-0.0245
(0.0000)

ST Debt

19489

0.0431

0.0923

0.0063

19489

0.0580

0.1312

0.0057

-0.0149
(0.0000)

Payables

19640

0.0718

0.0733

0.0502

19640

0.0955

0.1391

0.0458

-0.0238
(0.0000)

Monetary Liability

16696

0.2517

0.1978

0.2264

16696

0.2562

0.2555

0.1701

-0.0045
(0.0016)

Ratio

Panel B: Market Capitalization and Average Market Capitalization as Ratio Divisors:
Average Market Cap. as a Ratio Divisor

Market Capitalization as a Ratio Divisor

Significance tests

Obs.

Mean

SD

Median

Obs.

Mean

SD

Median

Difference in
means

Interest Bearing Inv.

15970

0.0518

0.1070

0.0033

15970

0.0556

0.1180

0.0033

-0.0038
(0.0000)

Cash

15873

0.1255

0.1379

0.0812

15873

0.1348

0.1543

0.0842

-0.0093
(0.0000)

Receivables

15528

0.1362

0.1579

0.0837

15528

0.1421

0.1673

0.0847

-0.0059
(0.0000)

Monetary Asset

14656

0.2805

0.2006

0.2298

14656

0.2908

0.2115

0.2348

-0.0103
(0.0000)

LT Debt

14506

0.1772

0.2234

0.0860

14506

0.1804

0.2279

0.0877

-0.0032
(0.0000)

ST Debt

15749

0.0536

0.1171

0.0062

15749

0.0582

0.1293

0.0062

-0.0046
(0.0000)

Payables

15832

0.0888

0.1224

0.0454

15832

0.0955

0.1363

0.0470

-0.0067
(0.0000)

Monetary Liability

13355

0.2510

0.2428

0.1740

13355

0.2555

0.2464

0.1778

-0.0045
(0.0000)

Ratio
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TABLE 2.5: YEARLY AVERAGE RATIO FREQUENCIES
This table displays the yearly average ratio frequencies from 2010 to 2016. The ratios without parentheses are
calculated using total assets as a ratio divisor. The ratios in parentheses are calculated using market
capitalization as a ratio divisor. Column Observ. reports the number of firms in a given year in the sample.
Year

Interest
Inv.

Cash

Receivab.

Monetary
Asset

LT Debt

ST Debt

Payables

Monetary
Liability

Observ.

2010

0.0747
(0.0606)

0.1675
(0.1429)

0.1316
(0.1552)

0.3763
(0.3218)

0.1299
(0.1633)

0.0450
(0.0640)

0.0762
(0.1001)

0.2380
(0.2509)

2921

2011

0.0682
(0.0653)

0.1627
(0.1609)

0.1266
(0.1694)

0.3589
(0.3353)

0.1356
(0.1793)

0.0410
(0.0645)

0.0740
(0.1141)

0.2382
(0.2651)

2833

2012

0.0681
(0.0588)

0.1582
(0.1473)

0.1251
(0.1612)

0.3533
(0.3127)

0.1479
(0.1831)

0.0426
(0.0654)

0.0735
(0.1053)

0.2508
(0.2675)

2768

2013

0.0703
(0.0471)

0.1749
(0.1248)

0.1234
(0.1276)

0.3703
(0.2729)

0.1623
(0.1698)

0.0428
(0.0491)

0.0719
(0.0831)

0.2655
(0.2435)

2813

2014

0.0770
(0.0494)

0.1746
(0.1218)

0.1177
(0.1261)

0.3723
(0.2714)

0.1745
(0.1805)

0.0437
(0.0491)

0.0708
(0.0854)

0.2796
(0.2537)

2947

2015

0.0797
(0.0562)

0.1695
(0.1357)

0.1099
(0.1337)

0.3634
(0.2872)

0.1820
(0.1934)

0.0495
(0.0591)

0.0689
(0.0940)

0.2906
(0.2617)

2923

2016

0.0804
(0.0540)

0.1679
(0.1289)

0.1103
(0.1213)

0.3617
(0.2764)

0.2010
(0.2022)

0.0553
(0.0602)

0.0715
(0.0868)

0.3130
(0.2743)

2551

Average

0.0740
(0.0559)

0.1680
(0.1375)

0.1207
(0.1421)

0.3654
(0.2966)

0.1613
(0.1812)

0.0456
(0.0587)

0.0724
(0.0956)

0.2674
(0.2591)

-
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report in table 4 several ratio descriptive statistics. For each ratio, the total number
of observations, mean, standard deviation, and median are reported. Panel A
compares between the ratios when calculated using total assets as a ratio divisor and
when calculated using market capitalization as a ratio divisor. Panel B compares
between the ratios when calculated using average monthly market capitalization as
a ratio divisor and when calculated using market capitalization as a ratio divisor. The
last column displays a statistically and economically significant difference in means
for ratios in panel A, but minor economic significance for ratios in panel B. Table 5
displays the yearly average ratio frequencies from 2010 to 2016. Of all the other
ratios, the average long-term debt ratio was remarkably and continually trending up
over time. The other ratios stayed relatively stable over the sample period.
Before calculating the percentiles, we break our database into seven parts, one
part for each year. It is important to separate each observation year from another
since the WASC is a relative cross-sectional percentile measure. Firms with a ratio
of zero are initially excluded and are immediately given a percentile of 100%. For
each ratio, firms with a positive ratio are counted and ranked numerically from
bottom to top based on their ratio value. As per equation 5, percentiles are then
calculated. As per equation 4, the WASC is then calculated for each firm using three
different sets of financial ratio divisors and three different sets of weights. Table 6
displays the average ratio and percentile frequencies across ten sectors classified
according to SIC major group classifications. The last column reports the number of
firms in a given sector in the sample after excluding firms primarily operating within
Shariah-impermissible industries. A high portion of our sample firms is operating in
the manufacturing sector, whereas only 144 yearly firm observations are classified in
the agricultural sector. One important observation that can be drawn from table 6 is
that the average WASC across all the sectors is not widely dispersed. This is mainly
because the ratios tend to offset each other (e.g., the effect of a relatively low interestbearing investment ratio in the mining sector is offset by the effect of a relatively high
long-term debt ratio).
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TABLE 2.6: SECTOR AVERAGE RATIO AND PERCENTILE FREQUENCIES
This table displays the average ratio and percentile frequencies across different sectors from 2010 to 2016. The numbers
without parentheses are average ratios frequencies, whereas the numbers in parentheses are average percentile
frequencies. The weights of the various accounts of the WASC are reported in table 10. Column Observ. reports the
number of firms in a given sector in the sample. Total assets book value is used as the ratio divisor. The ten sectors are
classified according to SIC major group classifications.
Sector

SIC
Code

Interest
Inv.

Cash

Receivab.

Monetary
Asset

LT Debt

ST Debt

Payables

Monetary
Liability

WASC

Observ.

Agriculture,
Forestry,
Fishing

0100 to
0999

0.0477
(0.7459)

0.1032
(0.6670)

0.0940
(0.6237)

0.2449
(0.7319)

0.1606
(0.6831)

0.0333
(0.6744)

0.0601
(0.6784)

0.2540
(0.6794)

0.7030

144

Mining

1000 to
1499

0.0269
(0.8460)

0.1052
(0.6595)

0.0597
(0.7202)

0.1918
(0.8211)

0.2203
(0.6010)

0.0615
(0.7379)

0.0691
(0.5964)

0.3509
(0.6555)

0.7301

2244

Construction

1500 to
1799

0.0347
(0.7389)

0.1174
(0.5391)

0.1860
(0.4586)

0.3381
(0.7049)

0.2243
(0.5776)

0.0538
(0.6468)

0.1001
(0.4360)

0.3782
(0.5982)

0.6462

436

Manufacturing

2000 to
3999

0.0912
(0.7042)

0.2262
(0.4432)

0.1269
(0.4963)

0.4443
(0.6677)

0.1416
(0.7257)

0.0559
(0.7050)

0.0869
(0.4887)

0.2844
(0.7055)

0.6885

14286

Transport. &
Public Utilities

4000 to
4999

0.0317
(0.7411)

0.0514
(0.7786)

0.0762
(0.6628)

0.1592
(0.7410)

0.3013
(0.4536)

0.0443
(0.6420)

0.0457
(0.6885)

0.3913
(0.5406)

0.6308

3875

Wholesale
Trade

5000 to
5199

0.0205
(0.8482)

0.0875
(0.6683)

0.2300
(0.2821)

0.3380
(0.8019)

0.1951
(0.6352)

0.0667
(0.6536)

0.1737
(0.3119)

0.4355
(0.6264)

0.7054

1173

Retail Trade

5200 to
5999

0.0310
(0.8085)

0.1029
(0.5947)

0.0646
(0.7297)

0.1985
(0.7832)

0.2076
(0.6189)

0.0503
(0.7282)

0.1206
(0.3836)

0.3785
(0.6509)

0.7104

2018

Finance,
Insurance, Real
Estate

6000 to
6799

0.1536
(0.5904)

0.1811
(0.5551)

0.1214
(0.6800)

0.4560
(0.5914)

0.1833
(0.6889)

0.0784
(0.6842)

0.0425
(0.7569)

0.3042
(0.6904)

0.6459

937

Services

7000 to
8999

0.0703
(0.6989)

0.1941
(0.4619)

0.1658
(0.4371)

0.4301
(0.6621)

0.1656
(0.7022)

0.0574
(0.7021)

0.0694
(0.6211)

0.2924
(0.6981)

0.6819

5850

Public Admin.

9100 to
9999

0.1124
(0.7311)

0.2753
(0.5103)

0.0619
(0.7868)

0.4497
(0.7118)

0.0450
(0.9054)

0.1101
(0.7225)

0.0678
(0.7115)

0.2229
(0.8226)

0.7727

390

Average

-

0.0700
(0.7276)

0.1740
(0.5283)

0.1226
(0.5381)

0.3666
(0.6982)

0.1790
(0.6674)

0.0564
(0.6973)

0.0812
(0.5433)

0.3166
(0.6731)

0.6844

-
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TABLE 2.7: PAIRWISE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
The table reports the pairwise correlation coefficients between WASC and its various percentile accounts from 2010
to 2016. Total assets book value is used as the ratio divisor. The weights of the various accounts of the WASC are
reported in table 10. Correlation coefficients with superscripts ***, **, and * have a statistical significance level of
one percent, five percent, and ten percent, respectively. The last row reports the correlation between each account’s
ratio and the account’s percentile.
Percentiles

Interest
Inv.

Interest
Inv.

1.0000

Cash

0.1044***

1.0000

Receivab.

-0.0642***

-0.0733***

1.0000

Monetary
Asset

0.9932***

0.2049***

-0.0149***

1.0000

LT Debt

-0.1231***

-0.3699***

-0.0175***

-0.1616***

1.0000

ST Debt

-0.1035***

-0.0746***

-0.0104**

-0.1105***

0.1561***

1.0000

Payables

-0.2374***

0.0275***

0.2915***

-0.2146***

-0.0619***

0.2551***

1.0000

Monetary
Liability

-0.1629***

-0.3165***

-0.0012

-0.1941***

0.8314***

0.6757***

0.1523***

1.0000

WASC

0.6236***

-0.1014***

-0.0121**

0.6033***

0.5529***

0.4652***

-0.0397***

0.6652***

1.0000

Percentiles
with Ratios

-0.7778***

-0.8402***

-0.8605**

-0.4260***

-0.0798***

-0.0761***

-0.0929***

-0.0501***

-

Cash

Receivab.

Monetary
Asset
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LT Debt

ST Debt

Payables

Monetary
Liability

WASC

Table 7 reports the pairwise correlation coefficients between WASC and its
various percentile accounts. Due to the weights format, WASC is highly correlated
with interest-bearing investments and debt percentiles. Moreover, table 7 displays a
remarkable negative correlation between the cash and long-term debt percentiles.
Firms that hold greater slacks of cash tend to have lower long-term debt.
Furthermore, all the monetary liability percentile accounts are negatively correlated
with the interest-bearing investments percentile. This is probably because firms with
high monetary liabilities outstanding are not in a condition to invest in considerable
amounts of monetary assets. Lastly, the payables percentile is noticeably correlated
with the interest-bearing investments, receivables, and short-term debt percentiles.
For demonstration purposes, we chose to present our results for three publicly
traded US firms: Lumber Liquidators, Tesla, and General Motors. Table 8 presents
the WASC for Lumber Liquidators, Tesla, and General Motors over the period from
2013 to 2015 using total assets, market capitalization, and average market
capitalization as ratio divisors. As panel A indicates, Lumber Liquidators has high
WASC values using all three sorts of ratio divisors. This apparently because Lumber
Liquidators generally has low levels of monetary assets and liabilities, so that using
different sorts of ratio divisors would not significantly affect the ratio levels. Firms
with considerable amounts of monetary assets and liabilities, however, will show
varying WASC values depending on the ratio divisor used.
On the one hand, firms with a high market-to-book ratio will have relatively
higher WASC values when market values (e.g., market capitalization or average
market capitalization) are used as ratio divisors. As indicated in panel B, because
Tesla’s market-to-book ratio is high across all three years, its WASC values are
relatively higher when market values, as opposed to book values, are used as ratio
divisors. On the other hand, firms with a low market-to-book ratio will have relatively
higher WASC values when total book asset value is used as a ratio divisor. Panel C
displays that General Motors’ WASC values are relatively higher when book values
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TABLE 2.8: WASC FOR LUMBER LIQUIDATORS, TESLA, AND GENERAL MOTORS
Panels A, B, and C present the WASC for Lumber Liquidators, Tesla, and General Motors, respectively. For each
firm, the WASC is reported over the period from 2013 to 2015 using total assets, market capitalization, and average
market capitalization as ratio divisors. Market-to-book ratio is also reported. Market capitalization is the total
market value of a firm's outstanding common shares at the firm’s annual reporting date. Average market
capitalization is the average monthly market capitalization over the twelve months prior to each firm’s annual
reporting date.

Panel A: Lumber Liquidators Inc.
2013

2014

2015

WASC using total assets as a ratio divisor

0.9502

0.9648

0.9166

WASC using market capitalization as a ratio divisor

0.9767

0.9772

0.8934

WASC using average market capitalization as a ratio divisor

0.9581

0.9656

0.9121

Market-to-Book Ratio

6.0455

3.6671

1.4489

2013

2014

2015

WASC using total assets as a ratio divisor

0.5751

0.5046

0.5667

WASC using market capitalization as a ratio divisor

0.7828

0.7096

0.7367

WASC using average market capitalization as a ratio divisor

0.7352

0.6852

0.7123

Market-to-Book Ratio

8.6492

5.4403

4.6279

2013

2014

2015

WASC using total assets as a ratio divisor

0.4249

0.4134

0.3953

WASC using market capitalization as a ratio divisor

0.1649

0.1208

0.1234

WASC using average market capitalization as a ratio divisor

0.1440

0.1158

0.1012

Market-to-Book Ratio

1.1830

1.1403

1.0966

Panel B: Tesla Inc.

Panel C: General Motors Co.
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are used as ratio divisors. This is apparently because General Motors’ market-to-book
ratio is low across all three years.
Table 8 signifies the importance of choosing the appropriate ratio divisor to
calculate the WASC. As discussed in section three of this paper, the use of market
values as ratio divisors may be inappropriate in assessing Shariah compliance
because they mainly reflect future growth opportunities rather than current
possessions of assets and liabilities. Also, and most importantly, the use of market
values is expected to lead to undesirable investment performances when stocks are
mispriced.
Table 9 presents three different WASC values using three different sets of weights
for General Motors for the year of 2015 using total assets as a ratio divisor. It seems
that the weight effect (i.e., the use of different sets of weights) does not significantly
change the WASC. Compared to the first set of weights, the second set of weights
assigns different weights to the different accounts of monetary assets and liabilities,
whereas the third set of weights assigns different weights to both monetary assets
and liabilities and their different accounts. The weight effect may become significant
if there are large discrepancies between the various percentile values used to
calculate the WASC. Table 10 reports the WASC along with its various accounts for
General Motors over the period from 2013 to 2015 using total assets as a ratio divisor.
The WASC seems to be stable and consistent over time. To test for WASC persistence,
we use the Durbin-Watson statistic and residual plots. Our unreported results show
that the time series is positively autocorrelated. This implies that WASC tends to
remain in an equivalent status and persist from one year to the next. In other words,
future values of WASC are probabilistically predictable and depend on past and
current values.
Table 11 reports the WASC along with its various accounts for Lumber
Liquidators, Tesla, and General Motors for the year of 2015 using total assets as a
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TABLE 2.9: WASC AND PERCENTILE ACCOUNTS FOR GENERAL MOTORS IN 2015
This table reports the WASC along with its various percentile accounts for General Motors for the year of 2015 using
total assets as the ratio divisor. All financial ratios used to calculate the WASC are also reported in parentheses.
Three different WASC values are presented using three different sets of weights. The numbers in brackets denote
the weights of the various accounts of the WASC.

GM 2015

2015

Weight 1

Weight 2

Weight 3

Interest-bearing
Investments

0.2937
(15%)

[70%]

[85%]

[85%]

Cash

0.5765
(8%)

[20%]

[10%]

[10%]

Receivables

0.3655
(14%)

[10%]

[05%]

[05%]

Monetary Assets

-

0.3575
[45%]

0.3256
[45%]

0.3256
[35%]

Long Term Debt

0.5561
(22%)

[55%]

[55%]

[55%]

Short Term Debt

0.3363
(10%)

[35%]

[40%]

[40%]

Payables

0.2397
(12%)

[10%]

[05%]

[05%]

Monetary
Liabilities

-

0.4476
[55%]

0.4524
[55%]

0.4524
[45%]

Interest R/E

-

-

-

0.5436
[20%]

WASC

-

0.4070

0.3953

0.4263
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TABLE 2.10: WASC AND PERCENTILE ACCOUNTS FOR GENERAL MOTORS FROM 2013 TO 2015
This table reports the WASC along with its various percentile accounts for General Motors over the period from
2013 to 2015 using total assets as the ratio divisor. All financial ratios used to calculate the WASC are also reported
in parentheses. The numbers in brackets denote the weights of the various accounts of the WASC.

GM

Weights

2013

2014

2015

Interest-bearing
Investments

[85%]

0.2771
(15%)

0.2876
(15%)

0.2937
(15%)

Cash

[10%]

0.4870
(12%)

0.5079
(11%)

0.5765
(8%)

Receivables

[05%]

0.3891
(14%)

0.3523
(14%)

0.3655
(14%)

Monetary Assets

[45%]

0.3037
(41%)

0.3129
(40%)

0.3256
(36%)

Long Term Debt

[55%]

0.6635
(13%)

0.6093
(18%)

0.5561
(22%)

Short Term Debt

[40%]

0.3682
(9%)

0.3698
(8%)

0.3363
(10%)

Payables

[05%]

0.2387
(14%)

0.2522
(13%)

0.2397
(12%)

Monetary Liabilities

[55%]

0.5242
(36%)

0.4957
(39%)

0.4524
(45%)

WASC

-

0.4249

0.4134

0.3953
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TABLE 2.11: WASC FOR LUMBER LIQUIDATORS, TESLA, AND GENERAL MOTORS IN 2015
This table reports the WASC along with its various percentile accounts for Lumber Liquidators, Tesla, and General
Motors for the year of 2015 using total assets as the ratio divisor. All financial ratios used to calculate the WASC are
also reported in parentheses. The numbers in brackets denote the weights of the various accounts of the WASC.

2015

Weights

Lumber Liquidators Inc.

Tesla Inc.

General Motors Co.

Interest-bearing
Investments

[85%]

1.0000
(0.0%)

0.8635
(0.3%)

0.2937
(15%)

Cash

[10%]

0.6426
(6%)

0.4015
(15%)

0.5765
(8%)

Receivables

[05%]

0.7303
(4%)

0.8569
(2%)

0.3655
(14%)

Monetary Assets

[45%]

0.9508
(10%)

0.8170
(17%)

0.3256
(36%)

Long Term Debt

[55%]

0.8681
(4%)

0.5079
(25%)

0.5561
(22%)

Short Term Debt

[40%]

1.0000
(0.0%)

0.1771
(33%)

0.3363
(10%)

Payables

[05%]

0.2247
(13%)

0.2337
(13%)

0.2397
(12%)

Monetary Liabilities

[55%]

0.8887
(17%)

0.3618
(71%)

0.4524
(45%)

WASC

-

0.9166

0.5667

0.3953
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ratio divisor. All financial ratios used to calculate the WASC are also reported in
parentheses. Lumber Liquidators seem to have low proportions of monetary assets
and liabilities, making it more Shariah compliant than 91.66% of publicly traded US
firms in 2015. It does not carry any interest-bearing investments or short-term debt
and hence was given a percentile of 100% for both accounts. On the contrary, Tesla
carries very significant proportions of short-term debt and hence was given a shortterm debt percentile of 17.71%. This percentile means that Tesla's short-term debt
obligations are more Shariah compliant than only 17.71% of publicly traded US firms
in 2015. Stated differently, in terms of Shariah compliance, Tesla's holdings of shortterm debt are worse than 82.29% of publicly traded US firms in 2015.
Figure 1 displays the ratios and percentiles of the various WASC accounts for
General Motors over the period from 2010 to 2016 using total assets as a ratio divisor.
It seems clear that there exists a negative relationship between each ratio and its
percentiles. Though, this negative relation is not perfect and varies from each account
to another due to the changing aggregate firm behavior over time. For example, while
General Motors' interest-bearing investments ratio remained constant at 15% from
2013 to 2015, its interest-bearing investments percentile increased gradually from
27.71% to 29.37% over the same time period. This is probably because US firms have,
on average, experienced an increase in the interest-bearing investments ratio over
the sample period (i.e., aggregate US firms’ interest-bearing investments behavior
has worsened from the Shariah stand-point).
Figure 2 displays the ratios and percentiles of monetary assets and liabilities
along with the WASC for Lumber Liquidators, Tesla, and General Motors over the
period from 2010 to 2016 using total assets as a ratio divisor. Since firms were ranked
from bottom to top based on their ratio value, firms with the highest ratio for a given
account will always have the lowest percentile for that account. Also, firms with the
second highest ratio will always have the second lowest percentile and so on. For
example, figure 2 shows that, relative to the other two firms, Lumber Liquidators has
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FIGURE 2.1: WASC'S ACCOUNTS FOR GENERAL MOTORS FROM 2010 TO 2016
These figures report the ratios and percentiles of the various WASC accounts for General Motors over the period from
2010 to 2016 using total assets as a ratio divisor. The weights of the various accounts of the WASC are reported in
table 10. The correlation between interest-bearing investments percentile and ratio is -0.9455. The correlation between
cash percentile and ratio is -0.9841. The correlation between receivables percentile and ratio is -0.9678. The correlation
between long term debt percentile and ratio is -0.9929. The correlation between short term debt percentile and ratio is
-0.9672. The correlation between payables percentile and ratio is -0.9587. The correlation between monetary assets
percentile and ratio is -0.6369. The correlation between monetary liabilities percentile and ratio is -0.9891.
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FIGURE 2.2: MONETARY ASSETS AND LIABILITIES FROM 2010 TO 2016
These figures report the percentiles and ratios of monetary assets and liabilities along with the WASC for Lumber
Liquidators, Tesla, and General Motors over the period from 2010 to 2016 using total assets as the ratio divisor. The
weights of the various accounts of the WASC are reported in table 10.
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the lowest monetary assets ratio, but the highest monetary assets percentile over the
sample period.
6. Conclusion:
This paper develops a financial quantitative measure (i.e., WASC) that reflects
the rate to which a firm complies with Shariah relative to other firms located in a
certain region at a certain time. The appealing feature of the WASC is its capability
of translating financial Shariah-compliance assessments into a simple single precise
quantitative number, which then can be tested and compared over time and across
firms. The WASC can be used by academics to proxy for financial Shariah-compliance
and by fund managers to create a balance between optimizing investment returns
and Shariah compliance.
In few words, the paper started with providing a brief review of current Shariahcompliant equity screening practices. Next, it continued with analyzing all the
optional formats used to customize the WASC by specifying the region, set of weights,
and set of financial ratios. The general formula for the WASC is then presented.
Finally, the paper concluded by showing and discussing illustrative results using a
sample of all publicly traded US firms from the year 2010 to 2016.
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